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Abstract 
In cooperative compliance programs, firms and tax administrations agree on cooperation 
instead of confrontation. Firms provide full transparency and advanced tax control 
frameworks. Tax administrations, in turn, offer certainty as to the tax treatment of complex 
transactions. In this study, we test how firms’ perceptions of tax risk, the quality of tax risk 
management, and compliance costs are related to cooperative compliance. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study that attempts to analyze both reasons for and consequences of 
participation in cooperative compliance programs. We examine the Austrian cooperative 
compliance pilot project known as horizontal monitoring that was aimed at large businesses 
and launched in 2011. We use survey data from representatives of firms participating in the 
pilot project and a sample of comparable firms under a traditional ex-post audit regime. We 
conduct group comparisons to test differences between these groups, as well as mediation 
analyses to shed light on more complex relationships between variables. Results show that 
horizontal monitoring firms perceive a significantly higher increase in tax certainty, which is 
associated with significant relative decreases in tax risk and compliance costs. Furthermore, 
while the quality of tax risk management upon entering the pilot project appears significantly 
higher for horizontal monitoring firms, they do not report greater improvement in tax risk 
management compared to the control group. These results are relevant for the development of 
cooperative compliance programs and the decision to participate in them. 
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We test whether cooperative compliance (CC), designed as a trust-based alternative to conventional tax 
audits, is an effective tool to decrease firms’ tax risk, to foster the quality of their tax risk management 
(TRM), and, at the same time, to reduce firms’ compliance costs. To this end, we consider the Austrian 
setting, where the CC pilot project known as horizontal monitoring (HM) was carried out from 2011 to 
2018 and subsequently integrated into Austrian law in 2019. We compare survey responses from firms 
taking part in the pilot project with responses from comparable firms not participating in HM. Our results 
suggest that HM has decreased perceived tax risk (referring to the likelihood and magnitude of 
unexpected, adverse tax outcomes) and compliance costs by strongly increasing perceived tax certainty 
(referring to the certainty that tax authorities will not challenge current tax positions). Furthermore, we 
find evidence that firms reporting more developed tax-risk management systems were more likely to 
select and be accepted into the HM pilot project. 
According to the OECD (2008), cooperative alternatives to tax audits have been developed 
primarily as a response to growing concerns of governments and the public about tax avoidance by large 
businesses. Based on the concept of “enhanced relationships” (OECD 2008), the OECD Forum on Tax 
Administration published an updated framework known as cooperative compliance (OECD 2013). It 
describes how tax administrations and taxpayers can have ongoing, trust-based relationships instead of 
the traditional, confrontational approach of ex-post tax audits. CC requires firms to employ advanced 
tax control frameworks and to be fully transparent regarding transactions, financial records, and other 
tax-related issues. In turn, tax administrations are expected to behave predictably and provide timely 
legal certainty to participating firms. Indeed, surveys conducted with Austrian firms confirm the central 
role of tax certainty, i.e., early agreement between tax authority and firm on the appropriate tax treatment 
of specific cases and circumstances, to avoid later disagreement and litigation (Enachescu et al. 2019). 
Viewing CC from a principal-agent perspective, with the tax administration assuming the 
principal’s role and a firm’s management that of the agent, we propose that the reduction of agency 
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conflicts is the primary goal of CC. Under conventional audit regimes, tax administrations exert control 
over firms’ management by enforcing tax law with the help of tax audits and litigation, often with long 
delays between actual transactions, the detection of questionable tax positions, and the resolution of 
legal conflicts. In a CC program, by contrast, both parties are expected to behave transparently and 
reduce information asymmetries between management and tax administration, which may stem from 
both management’s tax decisions or administration’s interpretation and application of tax law. Aligning 
the firm’s tax risk behavior with the tax administration’s preferences, CC may thus directly affect firms’ 
governance structure. From this, tax administrations expect increased and timely tax compliance. 
Ultimately, a tax administration may be able to re-allocate its resources and focus on the audit of high-
risk taxpayers.  
A reduction of information asymmetries and agency costs may reduce costs incurred not 
only by the tax administration but also by firms, which are expected to benefit from an improved 
relationship with tax authorities, resulting in immediate certainty as to the correct treatment of difficult 
tax questions. This stands in stark contrast to the conventional ex-post audit context, in which 
clarification of questions may take several years and cause a financial burden for firms. Furthermore, 
participation in HM should be more likely for firms with already advanced tax risk management systems 
and lower tax risk because such firms are most likely to benefit from a reduction of agency costs relative 
to costs associated with CC participation.  
Against this background, this paper aims to assess whether CC fulfills its expectations. 
Specifically, we investigate if CC is associated with lower tax risk, better tax risk management, and 
lower compliance costs. We understand tax risk as the likelihood and magnitude of unexpected tax 
outcomes that can adversely affect the firm. We follow Brühne and Schanz (2019) in their definition of 
tax risk management as the entirety of a firm’s actions, tools, and processes implemented to prevent, 
mitigate, and control corporate tax risk exposure. Compliance costs comprise all costs incurred by the 
firm to comply with legal and administrative requirements in a tax context, including the process of 
determining taxes payable.  
We expect the relationship between CC, tax risk, and tax risk management to be triangular. 
While we expect CC to influence tax risk and tax risk management, tax risk, and the state of tax risk 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3612959
 4 
management may also be regarded as important determinants of self-selecting or being admitted to CC. 
We thus expect that firms with low tax risk exposure and advanced tax risk management are more likely 
to participate in CC than high tax-risk firms with less developed tax risk management. At the same time, 
we also expect that CC participation further reduces tax risk and improves tax risk management.  
To test these expected relationships, we compare survey responses from firms taking part 
in the pilot project (i.e., the treatment group) with responses from comparable firms not participating in 
the pilot project (i.e., the control group). We choose the Austrian implementation of CC, known as 
horizontal monitoring (HM), which closely follows the OECD recommendations for CC programs. 
From 2011 to 2018, HM was implemented as a pilot project, in which 13 large Austrian firms 
participated at the time of our study.  
We conduct a survey in which 9 of the 13 firms participating in HM completed the 
questionnaire. As a control group, we invited 92 large non-HM firms that engage in tax policy, of which 
31 completed the questionnaire. Although the number of respondents – especially in the subsample of 
HM firms – is small, we cover the majority of HM firms in Austria, and all participants are senior, 
experienced tax managers. We thus expect that our results are representative of the population of 
Austrian HM firms and that they may be informative for other countries as well. 
Using questionnaire items based on current literature, we inquire about the perceived 
magnitude of current overall tax risk and tax risk management quality on a 7-point Likert-type scale. 
We also inquire about the perceived direction and magnitude of changes since entering HM (or during 
the past years for the control group), again on a 7-point scale, namely regarding the perceived change in 
tax risk, tax risk management quality, tax certainty, and compliance costs.  
Our empirical hypotheses and analyses follow the expectations described above. To test 
group differences, we conduct group comparisons using non-parametric and parametric tests. We further 
rely on mediation analyses to test more complex relationships between variables. Although we cannot 
directly assess differences in tax risk and tax risk management that may have led to HM participation, 
we examine how much of the differences in current tax risk management and tax risk are explained 
(mediated) by perceived changes and to what extent these differences might be explained otherwise, in 
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particular by pre-HM differences in these variables. In this way, we hope to shed more light on the 
potential selection or self-selection of firms into HM. 
We find that the perceived increase in tax risk is significantly smaller for HM firms, which 
can be explained, in part, by a drastic perceived increase in tax certainty compared to the control group, 
confirming the importance of certainty found in a previous study with Austrian HM firms (Enachescu 
et al. 2019). We also find that HM firms report significantly lower current tax risk. This difference, 
however, cannot be explained by a mediation via the perceived decrease in tax risk, suggesting 
alternative explanations for this difference. Regarding tax risk management, HM firms also report 
significantly better current tax risk management quality, but no additional improvements due to HM 
participation. Better tax risk management may thus have been a decisive factor for the likelihood of HM 
participation. Regarding compliance costs, we find that HM firms report a significantly lower increase 
in costs – an effect that appears to be mediated by the reduction in tax risk and the increase in tax 
certainty.  
Despite the small sample size, we find significant and strong differences and associations, 
in particular concerning the perceived change in certainty and tax risk. We confirm results using non-
parametric methods such as U-tests and Pearson correlations, as well as robustness tests in which we 
compute models removing the most influential observation from the sample.  
Exploring additional responses collected in the survey, we find that the perceived changes 
in tax risk are also reflected in more specific types of tax risk, such as litigation risk or reputational risk. 
With regard to current sources of tax risk, we find that HM firms indicate less compliance risk and 
marginally higher operational risk. While HM firms do not report a significantly larger increase in tax 
compliance than the control group, they perceive a much greater improvement in their relationship with 
tax authorities. Regarding tax risk management methods, we find that HM firms rely more on advance 
informal agreements. Together with the improved relationship with the Austrian tax administration, this 
may be one important way by which HM increased tax certainty.  
With CC becoming increasingly popular, systematic assessments of such programs are 
vital. However, the effects of CC programs on the firm have been the subject of little analysis. Despite 
the central role that tax risk, tax risk management, and compliance costs play in CC programs, there is 
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very little empirical evidence regarding how they are related to CC. To the best of our knowledge, we 
are the first to bridge this gap and investigate the reasons for and the consequences of CC participation 
on firms’ tax risk, tax risk management, and compliance costs by directly comparing CC firms with 
firms under a conventional audit regime. By providing important evidence on the effectiveness of CC 
in reducing information asymmetries and agency costs, we hope to facilitate the decision to participate 
in HM and to contribute to the further development of CC initiatives. 
2. Related background and literature 
2.1. Cooperative Compliance 
Cooperative compliance (CC) describes a family of alternative approaches to tax auditing that focus on 
cooperation and transparency. In such programs, firms generally commit to being completely transparent 
and improving their tax risk management. In exchange, tax administrations usually provide increased 
certainty and accelerated feedback about complex tax issues. CC can thus be described as “transparency 
in exchange for certainty” (OECD 2013, 28). 
CC programs typically aim at saving resources, namely reducing the workload on the side 
of revenue bodies and reducing compliance costs for firms, while at the same time reducing potentially 
aggressive tax planning and ensuring compliance with tax laws. CC has proved to be popular around the 
world. In its 2013 report, the OECD mentions 24 countries that had implemented CC at that time. In 
most countries, a well-established tax control framework is now a requirement for joining a CC program 
(OECD 2016). 
The development of the concept appears to follow in the wake of more service-oriented 
concepts of public administration, such as “new public management” or “new governance” (Ford and 
Condon 2011; de Widt 2017). Other theoretical influences of cooperative compliance lie in the so-called 
slippery-slope framework (Kirchler et al. 2008) and in “responsive regulation” (Braithwaite 2002). 
According to the slippery-slope framework, tax administrations’ power (i.e., audits and fines) and trust 
in tax administrations increase compliance, suggesting a balanced mix of coercive and cooperative trust-
building measures. Similarly, responsive regulation describes how tax administrations should react to a 
heterogeneous population of taxpayers. It suggests that harsh audits and fines are appropriate only for 
taxpayers that are intrinsically reluctant to follow the law. For the majority of taxpayers, however, 
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compliance can be improved with measures that foster self-regulation, such as services and education 
(Braithwaite 2002). 
Overall, cooperative compliance programs aim to create a win-win situation for firms and 
tax administrations. De Simone et al. (2013) support this notion analytically. They model the 
relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers and find that enhanced relationship programs are 
mutually beneficial under certain conditions, including that reviewing firms’ tax positions in CC is not 
more expensive than in an ex-post audit scheme and that the overall cost of the program is low. 
Austrian horizontal monitoring project 
Inspired by the OECD and by the Dutch cooperative compliance project,1 Austria 
introduced the HM pilot project in 2011 as part of the Fair Play Initiative of the Austrian Ministry of 
Finance (Schrittwieser and Woischitzschläger 2014; Elmecker et al. 2016). The Austrian HM project 
closely follows the recommendations laid out in the OECD CC framework (2008; 2013) and emphasizes 
the goal to create a win-win situation for firms and the Austrian tax administration (Elmecker et al. 
2016). 
The Austrian HM pilot project had several explicitly stated objectives: It was aimed at (i) 
fostering tax compliance, (ii) ensuring legally valid and timely tax collection, and, as a medium-term 
objective, (iii) shifting the resources of tax authorities towards high-risk taxpayers. As advertised 
benefits for companies, it aimed to (iv) reduce compliance costs and (v) promote legal certainty and 
planning security (Elmecker et al. 2016). 
The pilot project was directed exclusively at large firms2 (i.e., turnover of more than 40 
million Euro) falling under the responsibility of the Large-Business Unit (Großbetriebsprüfung) of the 
Austrian Ministry of Finance, who had their financial statements audited and certified. As a general rule, 
large businesses are subject to continuous tax audits (i.e., each business year is audited with near 
certainty), albeit with years of delay between the initial tax assessments and tax audits.   
 
1 Cooperative compliance (“Horizontal Monitoring”, referring to equal footing) was first introduced in the 
Netherlands in 2005, where a pilot project started with 20 large businesses (Stevens et al. 2012). Subsequently, the 
program expanded and soon included SMEs. Both businesses and authorities are in a trusting relationship with 
shared responsibilities in order to efficiently apply tax laws (Stevens et al. 2012; de Widt 2017). Currently, 
approximately 3,800 businesses participate (de Widt and Oats 2017). 
2 Even though also partnerships could participate, only corporations (including GmbH Co KG) did. 
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Participation in HM was voluntary. For admission to the pilot project, firms had to 
demonstrate tax compliance in the past. They were also required to have either an existing tax control 
framework or to be willing to develop such a framework in cooperation with the tax administration. 
Acceptance into the pilot study by the Large-Business Unit was part of a negotiation process that 
considered not only the quality of the tax control framework and prior good governance, but also 
questions of feasibility for tax auditors, i.e., the complexity of the business, and the total amount of 
resources dedicated to the pilot. For instance, financial institutions or the largest Austrian production 
corporations/groups, which have highly complex structures and business models, were not admitted. In 
the end, 15 firm groups with about 150 individual firms as group-members were part of the pilot, 2 
ended their participation early, and 13 remained in the project until the end of the pilot in 20163 
(Elmecker et al. 2016; Schrittwieser and Woischitzschläger 2014).  
Participation in HM was only possible if all members of a firm group (as defined in 
Austrian tax law) participated in the program. Moreover, for each firm group, one employee was 
designated as the main HM contact person. We thus expect firms within each group to be strongly 
aligned regarding taxation and their experiences with HM. For the remainder of the paper, we refer to 
HM firm groups as “HM firms”. 
The 13 participating firms cover a variety of sectors and business models. They include six 
from the production sector, four from trade, two from energy, and one from the services sector. Seven 
of the HM firms engage in business-to-business, and four in business-to-consumers. The two HM firms 
from the energy sector serve businesses and consumers. Seven of the HM firms are sub-groups with an 
international ultimate parent. For the remaining six, the ultimate parent is Austrian. Their long-term 
effective tax rates range from 14% to 33%, with an average of 23%.4 A time trend in the effective tax 
rates of HM firms is not observable, i.e., there is no indication that tax expense increased or decreased 
over the years that firms participated in HM. 
 
3 To the best of our knowledge, these 13 groups have remained in HM also after the pilot phase. 
4 Long term effective tax rate per firm is calculated as the sum of income taxes per firm related to the sum of 
earnings before taxes per firm, over the years 2011 to 2018, from consolidated profit and loss statements, as 
available from SABINA database. For one firm, no tax data were available. 
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Upon acceptance, companies underwent a final tax audit, after which both the taxpayer and 
the Austrian tax authorities signed a “declaration of intent”. In the subsequent regular HM process, 
managers and tax officers met regularly (usually quarterly or bi-annually) to discuss current tax issues 
(Schrittwieser and Woischitzschläger 2014; Stiastny 2015; Elmecker et al. 2016). 
Strictly speaking, HM provided only a “soft” version of legal certainty. Any pre-clearance 
during the HM process was not legally binding. Theoretically, both parties could eventually challenge 
the outcome in court, and the HM process did not legally prevent later ex-post audits. However, the 
evaluation report suggests that both sides followed the spirit of the agreement and refrained from 
challenging the outcome of the HM process. The Austrian tax administration, therefore, regarded the 
HM pilot project as a success (Elmecker et al. 2016). In case a firm wanted legal certainty in a strict 
sense, legally binding advance rulings were still available and in use. Usage of binding advance rulings 
is similar among HM firms and non-HM firms, as indicated by our survey. See Section 5.4 for more 
detailed analyses on the importance of tax risk management methods. 
Marking the conclusion of the pilot project, Austria fully implemented HM for large 
businesses in 2019.5 The new legal basis provides specific provisions regulating legal certainty and 
setting more explicit standards for tax control frameworks required for acceptance into HM. 
Effects of cooperative compliance programs 
Several national CC projects have been analyzed by researchers and practitioners. 
Literature predominantly focuses on legal questions, national experiences with CC, and differences 
between CC programs (e.g., Dabner and Burton 2009; Påhlsson 2013; Bronżewska 2016; Colon 2017; 
Björklund Larsen et al. 2018; Brøgger and Aziz 2018; Potka-Soininen et al. 2018; Björklund Larsen and 
Oats 2019; Majdanska and Pemberton 2019; de Widt et al. 2019). 
Only a small number of studies empirically investigate the effects of CC on firms. 
Huiskers-Stoop (2015) discusses the effectiveness of the Dutch HM project for medium-sized 
businesses in the Netherlands. She emphasizes that, due to potential self-selection, HM could merely be 
a “formalization” of already existing differences in tax attitude and behavior. Using a survey assessing 
firms’ general experiences and firms’ perceived effectiveness of HM, she finds that HM likely improved 
 
5 Sections 153a – 153g Bundesabgabenordnung  
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tax certainty and tax compliance and reduced compliance costs for firms. The Dutch Tax and Customs 
Administration (Belastingdienst 2017) presented a comprehensive evaluation of HM to the Dutch 
parliament. Using surveys, they find a positive association between HM and compliance. 
An evaluation report of the Austrian HM pilot project, based on limited statistics, survey 
data, and workshops, indicates that the project largely succeeded in fulfilling its goals of providing 
certainty and increasing efficiency (Elmecker et al. 2016). Enachescu et al. (2019), using survey data 
from this evaluation, analyze HM firms’ and tax auditors’ perceptions of the Austrian HM project in 
context with organizational change processes. They find that legal and planning certainty is important 
to stakeholders and regarded as one of HM’s main advantages. However, they observe that CC appears 
to represent a challenging paradigm shift for the Austrian tax administration.  
These studies focus mostly on compliance and certainty. While our study also investigates 
the importance of tax certainty in the context of CC, it focuses on firms’ tax risk and tax risk management 
to assess how tax administrations affect firms’ governance. Further, we use mediation analysis to 
disentangle the reasons for and the consequences of HM participation in more detail. 
Other studies also highlight the importance of increased tax certainty and predictability for 
CC firms (Boll and Brehm Johansen 2018; Goslinga et al. 2019). In an empirical analysis using 
confidential data from the IRS, Beck and Lisowsky (2014) analyze the effect of the US Compliance 
Assurance Process (CAP) on FIN48 tax reserves, a proxy for tax uncertainty disclosed in financial 
statements. They find that CAP participation is especially likely for firms with medium pre-CAP tax 
uncertainty. They also show that firms that participate in the scheme indeed reduce their FIN48 tax 
reserves.  
Overall, little is known about the relationship between potential causes and effects of HM 
participation. To our knowledge, there is no empirical study attempting to disentangle the two central 
requirements and motivations for CC participation, namely tax risk, and tax risk management, and the 
effects CC has on these variables. 
2.2. Cooperative compliance from a principal-agent perspective 
Cooperative compliance programs represent a significant change in the relationship between tax 
administrations and taxpayers. Its apparent popularity can be explained by an underlying desire to reduce 
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information asymmetries between firms and tax administrations. Viewing CC from the perspective of a 
principal-agent setting with self-protection (see Biswas et al. 2013) could explain the success of CC and 
strengthens theoretical predictions about its effects on tax risk, tax risk management, and compliance 
costs. 
In a classic principal-agent setting (Jensen and Meckling 1976), tax administrations have 
no role. With regard to taxation, Schön (2008, 34), for instance, asserts that while managers are obliged 
to administer the tax affairs of firms, they do so as part of the duties they owe to the shareholders, not 
to tax administrations which represent the state and its government. In tax matters, management thus 
serves the interests of the shareholders. In this regard, a stream of literature discusses the conflicting 
interests of the shareholder and the management with regard to tax avoidance or tax evasion (Crocker 
and Slemrod 2005; Chen and Chu 2005; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Phillips 2003). Phillips and 
Sansing (1998) rely on the principal-agent framework to describe the contract between the taxpayer and 
tax practitioner. 
In contrast to this classic interpretation of the shareholder as a principal and management 
as the agent, the theory may also explain the conception of cooperative compliance. Some scholars 
(mostly in the context of the determination of commercial and taxable profit) hold that the state's stake 
in a firm is similar to that of the shareholder (Döllerer 1988; Moxter 1997; Euler 1998). The state 
participates in a firm's profits and losses and is interested in not overly exploiting its funds. In such a 
setting, the state takes the principal's role, similar to a shareholder, which is entitled to a share in the 
firm's profit (i.e., in the form of taxes; Reinganum and Wilde 1985). 
In this principal-agent setting, information asymmetries may arise from the behavior of 
either party.  For instance, information asymmetries may relate to management's choices and decisions 
that affect the tax liability, particularly tax planning activities. Information asymmetries can also stem 
from tax administrations' interpretation and application of tax law in specific cases. The state, therefore, 
uses tools to reduce information asymmetries and conflicts with firm management. In a conventional 
confrontational setting, these tools usually comprise enforcement by regular tax audits and legal 
proceedings, causing high "agency costs" on both sides.  
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By contrast, CC requires firms to employ and improve internal tax risk management and to 
disclose their tax strategy and transactions in real time. Transparent behavior by both the firm and the 
tax administration in the form of early tax certainty, i.e., the reduction of information asymmetries for 
both sides simultaneously, may thus align the agents' tax risk behavior with the principal's preferences 
and ensures that a firm's management does not unduly reduce the state's share of the profit.  
Therefore, the way tax administrations act towards firms affects firms' governance structure 
(see Desai and Dharmapala 2008; Schön 2008). Furthermore, in line with signaling theory (Spence 1973; 
Spence 2002), firms that engage in CC can more easily signal to tax authorities an attitude which is more 
in line with the public interest of following the "spirit of the law" (OECD 2013). However, to be an 
attractive (voluntary) alternative to conventional tax audit regimes, CC should ultimately lead to a 
reduction in agency and signaling costs for both firms and tax administrations. 
2.3. Tax risk and tax risk management 
We regard tax risk as the likelihood and magnitude of unexpected tax outcomes that can adversely affect 
the firm. Literature shows similar definitions: Neuman et al. (2020), for example, define tax risk as “the 
uncertainty about future tax outcomes”, which can stem from (i) economic risk, (ii) tax law uncertainty, 
and (iii) inaccurate information processing. Similarly, Neubig and Sangha (2004) define tax risk as “the 
likelihood and magnitude of outcomes that are different than expected” (p. 114). Emphasizing its 
potentially negative effects, Ernst & Young describe tax risk as something that “either adversely affects 
the company’s tax or business objectives or results in an unanticipated or unacceptable level of 
monetary, financial statement or reputation exposure” (Ernst & Young 2006; quoted in Mulligan and 
Oats 2009, 685).6 More recently, Brühne and Schanz (2019) find in an interview study that definitions 
of tax risk differ among practitioner groups, with firm insiders perceiving solely the downside potential. 
They identify six tax risk components: Financial risk, compliance risk, reputational risk, tax process 
risk, political risk, and personal liability risk. 
In line with Brühne and Schanz (2019), we define tax risk management “as the entirety of 
a firm’s actions, tools, and processes implemented to prevent, mitigate, and control corporate tax risk 
exposure”. The inclusion of tax risks in risk management systems results from increasing public 
 
6 Original source no longer accessible. 
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awareness and regulatory attention. A worldwide survey by Ernst & Young (2004), for example, 
identified a change in the role of tax directors. The reasons for this change lie in “increased scrutiny of 
companies’ tax issues by regulators, legislators, tax authorities, and the media; increased interest in 
corporate tax policy by shareholders, audit committees, and management; and an overall focus on 
transparency and disclosure, which itself is a direct result of such mandates as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in the United States [...] and the European Union’s [...] 8th Directive” (p. 1). Since then, the focus on 
tax has increased further, as demonstrated by the public debate about taxation and domestic as well as 
international efforts to combat tax avoidance and profit shifting. 
Increased focus on risky tax positions resulted in demand for tax risk management, which 
was met by consulting firms. PricewaterhouseCoopers, for example, developed a tax risk management 
model based on COSO’s internal control framework (Elgood et al. 2004). Nonetheless, the degree of 
implementation by firms of tax risk management still varies. Brühne and Schanz (2019) find in their 
interview study that, in fact, tax risk management is not well integrated with the general risk 
management system of the firm. Lavermicocca and McKerchar (2013) conclude that only few Australian 
firms have a tax risk management system in place. They find that for firms that employ tax risk 
management systems, the level of acceptable tax risk is reduced, and the level of income tax compliance 
improves. Wunder (2009) analyses the state of tax risk management in the United States and abroad. 
She identifies transactional risk from M&A activities as the most prominent type of tax risk for firms. 
Other research on tax risk management mostly focuses on managerial aspects (e.g., Plesner Rossing 
2013; Plesner Rossing and Rohde 2014). 
One tool to mitigate tax risk is the establishment of a tax control framework, which is a 
central requirement for firms to participate in CC programs. Tax control frameworks are thus a 
substantial part of the tax risk management system, which is one aspect of the overall risk management 
system and the governance structure of firms (Whait 2012; OECD 2013, chap. 4; Colon and Swagerman 
2015; van der Enden and de Groot 2015; van der Hel-van Dijk and Siglé 2015). Seen from the 
perspective of tax administrations, a well-organized tax control framework reduces the risk of fraud, tax 
evasion, and possibly even tax avoidance (Freedman et al. 2009; Mulligan and Oats 2009). Siglé (2019), 
using survey data and tax compliance statistics, conducted a detailed analysis of HM-related variables 
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and their effects on tax compliance. While the quality of the tax control framework is positively related 
to taxpayer transparency and the quality of the working relationship with the tax administration, the 
author only finds little evidence on the effects of tax control frameworks and transparency on tax 
compliance. Goslinga et al. (2019), however, find that for firms, the quality of tax control frameworks 
is positively associated with the need for certainty and the perceived importance of tax compliance. 
3. Hypotheses development 
Based on the characteristics of HM and on the principal-agent setting, we assume that the primary goal 
of HM is the reduction of information asymmetries and agency conflicts by requiring firms to utilize a 
tax control framework and by increasing transparency. For firms, this should lead to a reduction of 
uncertain tax outcomes, which may ultimately lead to a reduction in compliance costs.  
Besides differences in these variables between HM firms and non-HM firms, we thus 
expect indirect (i.e., mediation) effects of HM on tax risk and on compliance costs via certainty. 
Moreover, because tax risk and tax risk management may represent both cause and effect of HM 
participation (i.e., firms may self-select into HM), we also formulate mediation hypotheses to 
disentangle these relationships.  
HM may achieve a reduction in tax risk both by requiring firms to behave more 
transparently, as well as by providing early certainty for participating firms. Because of timely 
clarification of tax issues in HM, we expect HM firms to perceive improved tax certainty. As tax 
certainty, i.e., certainty about the sustainability of tax positions, is discussed as an important determinant 
of tax risk, we expect the improvement of tax certainty to be a significant driver of tax risk reductions. 
A remaining direct effect of HM on tax risk unexplained by changes in certainty may be attributed to 
other, unobserved reasons (e.g., higher transparency). We hypothesize: 
H1: Compared to non-HM firms, HM firms report a larger reduction (or a smaller 
increase) in perceived tax risk. 
H1a: The negative association between HM and changes in perceived tax risk is mediated 
by increased perceived tax certainty (relative to non-HM firms). 
Agency costs (i.e., compliance with enforcement measures) should be comparatively more 
costly to firms with inherently little tax risk. Due to much stricter standards regarding the transparency 
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of firms, we thus expect that firms with lower tax risk are more likely to enter HM. In addition, 
improvements in tax risk should be reflected in the current tax risk. For both reasons, we expect HM 
firms to report a smaller current tax risk than non-HM firms. Both tax risk before HM participation, as 
well as the hypothesized reductions of tax risk during HM, may explain lower current tax risk reported 
by HM firms. To assess whether lower current tax risk in HM firms is associated with HM only via 
improvements in tax risk or via other, unobserved differences (e.g., pre-HM tax risk), we expand H2 by 
this mediation effect: 
H2: Compared to non-HM firms, HM firms report a smaller perceived current tax risk. 
H2a: The association between HM and lower perceived current tax risk is mediated by 
reductions in perceived tax risk (relative to non-HM firms). 
A tax control framework can be seen as an important measure to align the interests of firms 
with those of tax administrations. As a requirement for entering HM, firms either had to have a tax 
control framework in place or had to be prepared to develop it in cooperation with the tax administration. 
For both reasons, we expect tax risk management to be more elaborated in HM firms than in the control 
group. Because tax administrations may also support subsequent improvements of the tax control 
framework in HM firms, we expect HM to lead to higher tax risk management quality, as perceived by 
participants, during HM participation. Both tax risk management quality before HM participation and 
the hypothesized improvements of tax risk management during HM may explain better current tax risk 
management quality reported by HM firms. To assess whether higher current tax risk management 
quality in HM firms is associated with HM only via improvements in tax risk management, or via other, 
unobserved differences (in particular, pre-HM tax risk management), we expand H3 by this mediation 
effect: 
H3: Compared to the non-HM firms, HM firms report a higher perceived current TRM 
quality. 
H4: Compared to non-HM firms, HM firms report a larger improvement in perceived 
TRM quality. 
H3a: The association between HM and higher perceived current TRM quality is mediated 
by perceived improvements in TRM (relative to non-HM firms). 
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The effect of HM on compliance costs may be twofold. We assume that HM reduces overall 
compliance costs for firms because early clarification of tax matters may allow firms to avoid later tax 
audits and tax disputes and may reduce the need for tax consulting services, thereby reducing agency 
costs on the side of HM firms. On the other hand, HM requires advanced tax risk management that can 
increase compliance costs. In aggregate, we expect that compliance costs are lower in HM because we 
assume that voluntary participation in such a program is motivated, at least in part, by an overall cost 
reduction. A reported cost reduction through HM may be mediated by the perceived increase in tax 
certainty and the perceived decrease in tax risk. A (marginal) increase in compliance costs, however, 
may be mediated by better tax risk management. Therefore, we expand H5 by these mediation effects: 
H5: Compared to non-HM firms, HM firms report a larger perceived reduction (or 
smaller increase) in compliance costs. 
H5a: The association between HM and lower perceived compliance costs is mediated by 
the increase in perceived tax certainty (relative to non-HM firms). 
H5b: The association between HM and lower perceived compliance costs is mediated by 
the reduction of perceived tax risk (relative to non-HM firms). 
H5c: The association between HM and (marginally) higher perceived compliance costs is 
mediated by an improvement in perceived TRM quality (relative to non-HM firms). 
4. Method 
4.1. Data collection and participants 
All 13 HM firms consented to public identification (Elmecker et al. 2016, 21).7 The survey was therefore 
addressed to all 13 firms participating in HM at the time of the survey, namely to the individuals who 
manage their firms’ HM process. They serve as the main contact to tax administration, and we expect 
them to have the best knowledge about the program within each firm.  
To address our control group, namely firms that were subject to traditional ex-post tax 
audits, we invited heads of tax of 92 firms that were members of the Tax Policy Group in the Federation 
of Austrian Industries.8 We expect all participants to be experienced in tax matters and in senior 
 
7 One firm opted out of the HM regime in 2017. 
8 Such selection seems preferable to a broader dissemination because firms in the Tax Policy Group can be 
expected to be particularly comparable to HM firms in terms of size and engagement in tax matters. 
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positions.9 The Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Federation of Austrian Industries provided support 
with identifying potential participants and sending out invitations. Data collection took place between 
October 2017 and March 2018. We used follow-up phone calls and e-mails as reminders to increase 
participation.  
We acknowledge that the selection of our participants into HM firms is likely endogenous: 
HM firms self-select into participation in the pilot and are accepted into the program by the Austrian tax 
administration. According to the criteria for participation in the pilot, HM firms must have demonstrated 
prior tax compliance and (the willingness to develop) advanced TRM systems. Non-HM firms, however, 
may or may not have been compliant in the past and may differ with regard to tax risk management. 
With regard to our control group, firms self-select into membership of the Federation’s Tax Policy 
Group, which includes predominantly production firms, but also financial industry, infrastructure, and 
related services. By asking about both present tax risk and TRM quality as well as perceived changes 
therein, we attempt to shed more light on the reasons for and consequences of HM participation. 
Table 1 shows the number of invited firms and response rates. Some participants did not 
complete the questionnaire. In our main analyses, we only use data from participants who answered all 
items of interest. We achieved high response rates in both groups, with 9 of 13 invited HM firms and 31 
of 92 invited non-HM firms completing the full questionnaire. 
 




ex-post tax audit 
(non-HM firms, control group) 
Total number of HM firms 13 - 
Firms invited 13 92 
Completed questionnaires 9 (69%) 31 (34%) 
Support Austrian Ministry of Finance 
Federation of Austrian 
Industries 
Table 1: Number of invited firms and responses by group. 
Responding firm and participant characteristics 
Overall, we find that responses by the control group and HM firm do not differ significantly 
in variables measuring general firm or individual characteristics. χ2-tests and U-tests show no significant 
differences between the two groups’ distributions of answers concerning gender, age, and position 
 
9 Our survey design cannot ensure that the addressees of the survey actually participated themselves. Delegation 
to employees is possible but not expected. 
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within the firms (see Table 2 for response frequencies and results of the statistical tests). We find that 
participants in both groups are predominantly male. The sample mostly consists of experienced, senior 
experts: 88% of participants are older than 35; 85% are tax director or a position senior thereto, including 
28% at board level. This high expertise indicated by participants substantiates our expectation that 
participants are experts who can give reliable assessments of their firms’ tax risk and governance. 
 HM firms (n = 9)   Control group (n = 31)  Total sample (n = 40)  Comparisons 
 n %  n %  n %  p (χ2) p (U) 
Gender          .495 - 
Female 1 11.1  3 9.7  4 10.0    
Male 6 66.7  26 83.9  32 80.0    
No answer 2 22.2  2 6.5  4 10.0    
Position          .195 - 
Chief executive 
officer 
0 0  3 9.7  3 7.5    
Chief financial officer 1 11.1  7 22.6  8 20.0    
Head of accounting 4 44.4  5 16.1  9 22.5    
Tax director 3 33.3  11 35.5  14 35.0    
Tax manager 1 11.1  0 0  1 2.5    
Other 0 0  2 6.5  2 5.0    
No answer 0 0  3 9.7  3 7.5    
Age          .748 .936 
25-34 0 0  1 3.2  1 2.5    
35-44 3 33.3  11 35.5  14 35.0    
45-54 2 22.2  11 35.5  13 32.5    
55-64 2 22.2  5 16.1  7 17.5    
> 64 0 0  1 3.2  1 2.5    
No answer 2 22.2  2 6.5  4 10.0    
Table 2: Sociodemographic data by group. This table shows participants’ responses to sociodemographic questions 
by group and results from χ2- and U-tests. “No answer” is included in χ2-tests because it was provided as an answer 
option and chosen by a non-trivial number of participants. The comparison column shows p-values of exact χ2-
tests, which test whether the distribution of answer frequencies is independent of the group, and of U-tests when 
applicable. 
Participants also provided details about their firms’ size and organizational setting (see 
Table 3 for response frequencies and χ2- and U-tests). Statistical tests do not indicate significant 
differences between the answers regarding firm characteristics, i.e., the number of tax jurisdictions the 
firm is subjected to, worldwide sales, whether the firm is publicly listed on the stock market, whether 
the firm is part of a group (a group operating only within Austria or an international group) and the 
residence country of the group parent.  
To guarantee anonymity, in particular for the small group of HM firms, we did not inquire 
about additional details. While we know which firms participated in HM, we cannot identify the firms 
who answered our questionnaire. It is reasonable to assume that in both groups, the majority of firms is 
from the production industry because the majority of the 13 HM firms invited to reply, as well as the 
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majority of members to the Federation of Austrian Industries, where we recruited our control group, are 
in the production industry. 
 HM firms (n = 9)   Control group (n = 31)  Total sample (N = 40)  Comparisons 
 n %  n %  n %  p (χ2) p (U) 
No. of tax jurisdictions          .435 .124 
2-5 4 44.4  7 22.6  11 27.5    
6-10 3 33.3  11 35.5  14 35.0    
11-20 0 0  2 6.5  2 5.0    
> 21 1 11.1  10 32.3  11 27.5    
No answer 1 11.1  1 3.2  2 5.0    
Firm sales in Austria 
(million euro) 
         .788 .746 
0.7-10 0 0  2 6.5  2 5.0    
10-40 0 0  1 3.2  1 2.5    
40-250 3 33.3  6 19.4  9 22.5    
250-1,000 1 11.1  9 29.0  10 25.0    
> 1,000 4 44.4  11 35.5  15 37.5    
No answer 1 11.1  2 6.5  3 7.5    
Publicly listed on the 
stock market 
         .669 - 
Yes 4 44.4  18 58.1  22 55.0    
No 3 33.3  9 29.0  12 33.0    
No answer 2 22.2  4 12.9  6 15.0    
Company part of a group          .397 - 
Yes, an Austrian 
group only 
0 0  1 3.2  1 2.5    
Yes, an international 
group 
7 77.8  28 90.3  35 87.5    
No 2 22.2  2 6.5  4 10.0    
Worldwide group sales 
(million euro) 
         .355 .593 
0.7-10 0 0  1 3.2  1 2.5    
40-250 0 0  1 3.2  1 2.5    
250-1,000 0 0  2 6.5  2 5.0    
> 1,000 5 55.6  23 74.2  28 70.0    
No answer 4 44.4  4 13.0  8 20.0    
Residence of group 
parent 
         .863 - 
Austria 3 33.3  14 45.2  17 42.5    
Germany 2 22.2  5 16.1  7 17.5    
Switzerland 0 0  1 3.2  1 2.5    
United Kingdom 1 11.1  1 3.2  2 5.0    
United States 0 0  2 6.5  2 5.0    
No answer 3 33.3  8 25.8  11 27.5    
Table 3: Firm characteristics by group. This table shows participants’ responses to questions regarding their firms’ 
characteristics and results from χ2- and U-tests. “No answer” is included in χ2-tests because it was provided as an 
answer option and chosen by a non-trivial number of participants. The comparison column shows p-values of exact 
χ2-tests, which test whether the distribution of answer frequencies is independent of the group, and of U-tests when 
applicable.  
4.2. Material 
We conducted an electronic survey study among Austrian firms that, at the time, did or did not 
participate in the HM pilot project. Designing the survey, we incorporated input from semi-structured 
interviews with the head of Large-Businesses Unit in the Austrian Ministry of Finance, with the head of 
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taxes of the Austrian subsidiary of a large multinational firm that participates in multiple cooperative 
compliance programs around the world, and with a senior academic specializing in the field.10 To avoid 
confidentiality concerns and reduce effort on the side of participants, we chose items that directly assess 
the subjective view of participants. Because the survey was aimed at tax experts, we are confident that 
all items were understood and interpreted correctly and were able to capture complex constructs such as 
“tax risk” and “tax certainty” reliably and efficiently. Pre-tests with 14 tax experts and scholars were 
able to confirm this. 
Questionnaire items covered the tax risk of the firm and specifically asked about the 
perceived level of tax risk at the present time and the perceived change in tax risk. Additional items 
inquired as to perceived sources of tax risk, based on Mulligan and Oats (2009) and Wunder (2009), 
which include transactional risk, operational risk, compliance risk, financial accounting risk, 
management risk, reputational risk, and portfolio risk. In addition, items covered the tax risk 
management system of the firm, based on Lavermicocca and McKerchar (2013). 
Most answers, apart from demographics, were given on a 7-point Likert-type scale, either 
expressing magnitude or agreement in general (1 to 7) or the magnitude and direction of change (-3 to 
+3). Demographic questions included group status, turnover, and residence country of firms, as well as 
gender, age, and position of respondents. To a limited extent, open questions were included. All 
questions and items used in the questionnaire are presented in Appendix 2. 
Because taxation is a sensitive area, we regarded anonymity as especially critical for the 
validity of our results. Participants were therefore guaranteed full anonymity, and responses were stored 
in an anonymized format with regard to both the firm and the individual. The number of demographic 
questions and their detail was limited to ensure that the identification of respondents or their firm is not 
possible. Furthermore, respondents could opt out of demographic questions. 
To assess our hypotheses, we focus on items and scales which directly assess the constructs 
of interest (see Table 4), namely the currently perceived tax risk and tax risk management quality and 
the perceived changes therein, as well as perceived changes in tax certainty and compliance costs. Other 
 
10 Interviews were conducted in 2015 with Hubert Woischitzschläger, Karl Hofbauer and Tina Ehrke-Rabl. 
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scales and items are used in additional tests to shed more light on differences between HM firms and 
the control group. 
5. Analysis and results 
5.1. Variables 
As variables for our main analysis, we use single-item values, as well as scale values calculated as the 
mean of multiple items. Table 4 presents scales and items used in the main analyses, including internal 
consistencies and item scale correlations for multi-item scales. All items were rated on 7-point scales. 
The variables are as follows: HM indicates HM participation, with non-HM firms being assigned 0 and 
HM firms 1. For the current tax risk reported by participants (CurrTaxRisk), we asked how participants 
would describe their company's tax risk profile on a scale from 1 (very low tax risk) to 7 (very high tax 
risk). For the perceived changes in tax risk (ΔTaxRisk), tax certainty (ΔCertainty), and compliance costs 
(ΔCosts), respondents could indicate the perceived change from -3 (strong decrease) via 0 (no change) 
to +3 (strong increase). We focus on subjective perceptions for two reasons: first, hard facts are often 
not readily available or contain highly sensitive information; second, based on participants' expertise, 
we can reasonably assume that responses are accurate and reliable. 








Items and scales assessing tax risk and tax risk management at the time of participation 
CurrTaxRisk (“How would you describe your company’s tax risk profile?”) 
[very low tax risk (1) – very high tax risk (7)] 
2.93 
(1.23) - 
CurrTRM (3-item scale) 
[not at all (1) – to a great extent (7)] 
4.53 
(1.52) 0.86 
“Is the identification and management of tax risk in your company part of the 
overall risk management system?” 
4.73 
(1.84) 0.70 
“Is your tax risk management system well documented?” 4.45 (1.68) 0.77 
“Is your tax risk management system operationalized in daily business?” 4.40 (1.65) 0.74 
Items and scales assessing change* 
[strong decrease (-3) – no change (0) – strong increase (+3)] 
ΔTaxRisk (“Tax risk for your company”) 0.75 (1.58) - 
ΔCertainty (“Tax certainty for your company”) 0.20 (1.90) - 
ΔCosts (“Compliance costs of your company”) 1.05 (1.34) - 
ΔTRM (3-item scale) 1.15 (0.81) 0.82 
“Quality of the tax risk management system” 1.13 (0.85) 0.82 




“Degree to which tax risk is included in the general risk management system” 0.93 (0.89) 0.59 
Table 4: Survey items and scales used in the analyses. *… HM firms reported change since entering the HM 
program, the control group for the last 10 (n = 23) or 5 years (n = 8). 
With regard to tax risk management (TRM) quality, participants specified the perceived 
degree of integration of tax risk in the firm’s general risk management, the degree of documentation of 
the tax risk management system and the operationalization of tax risk management in daily business, all 
on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a great extent), resulting in the 3-item scale CurrTRM. For the 
three-item scale ΔTRM, participants indicated the change in tax risk management quality, the change in 
the inclusion of tax risk in general risk management, and the change in the formalization of tax risk 
management, each on a scale from -3 (strong decrease) via 0 (no change ) to +3 (strong increase). Both 
scales show good internal consistencies of α ≥ 0.82.   
As the control variable Years, we use the time frame for which participants indicated 
change into the analyses of all dependent variables representing perceived change. Firms entered the 
HM program over the course of 4 years. We asked HM-firm participants to indicate changes since their 
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firm entered the pilot project, which could potentially affect the magnitude of perceived changes. We 
thus asked participants to indicate in which year their firms entered the HM program in order to compute 
the years until survey participation (M = 5.7, SD = 0.82, Range = 4-7). For non-HM firms, to achieve 
variation in the number of years, we asked about perceived changes during either the past 5 years or the 
past 10 years.11 From this information, we calculated the variable Years for both groups. 
5.2. Descriptive statistics and group differences 
As the first step in our analysis, we compute group comparisons between HM firms and our control 
group as well as correlations between our variables of interest. Because of our small sample size, 
outliers, and potential violations of distributional assumptions associated with t-Tests and Pearson 
correlations may affect estimates. Therefore, we also compute U-tests and Spearman rank correlations, 
which are based on ranks generated from the original data and are robust to outliers and distributional 
violations. Table 5 displays descriptive statistics by group as well as group comparisons based on t-Tests 
and U-tests. Table 6 displays Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients. 
 HM firms (n = 9)  
Control group 
(n = 31)  Comparisons 
Variables Mean SD Median 
Mean 







CurrTaxRisk 2.00 0.87 2 11.28  3.19 1.12 3 23.18  -1.19*** -11.90*** 
CurrTRM 5.48 0.70 5.67 28.78  4.25 1.59 4.67 18.10  1.23** 10.68** 
ΔTaxRisk -0.78 1.39 0 9.83  1.19+++ 1.35 1 23.60  -1.97*** -13.76*** 
ΔCertainty 2.22+++ 0.83 2 33.00  -0.39 1.71 -1 16.87  2.61*** 16.13*** 
ΔCosts 0.22 0.67 0 13.33  1.29+++ 1.40 2 22.58  1.07** -9.25** 
ΔTRM 1.22+++ 0.71 1 21.22  1.13+++ 0.84 1 20.29  -0.09 0.93 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics and group comparisons. This table displays means, medians, and mean ranks of our 
main variables of interest as well as group comparison of means and mean ranks. Significance levels are based on 
conventional independent t-Tests (for mean differences) and on exact U-tests (for mean rank differences). ***, ** 
and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. +, ++, and +++ denote means 
of items/scales measuring perceived change that are significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
Both t- and U-tests (see Table 5) yield very similar results and indicate that HM firms 
perceive significantly less current tax risk (CurrTaxRisk), lending support to Hypothesis H2. Tests also 
indicate that HM firms experienced significantly stronger reductions in tax risk (ΔTaxRisk) and 
 
11 We did not achieve a balanced distribution of years in the control group. Nine participants of the control group 
answered change-related questions for the past 5 years, 22 for the past 10 years. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3612959
 24 
compliance costs (ΔCosts), providing evidence for Hypothesis H1 and H5. Moreover, HM firms report 
significantly greater improvements in certainty (ΔCertainty), which we hypothesize to be the main 
mechanism by which tax risk is reduced. This mediation effect formulated in Hypothesis H1a is tested 
in the following section. While HM firms perceive their current TRM systems to be of significantly 
higher quality (CurrTRM) than the control group, they do not appear to have experienced a larger 
improvement in ΔTRM. We thus find evidence for Hypothesis H3, but not H4.  
With regard to perceived changes in tax risk and certainty, it is noteworthy that signs also 
point in opposite directions, with HM firms indicating an increase in certainty significantly different 
from zero, and the control group indicating an increase in tax risk significantly different from zero. To 
better illustrate the distribution in responses and differences between groups, Figure 1 shows responses 
by each participant in variables measuring change. 
 
Figure 1: Responses to items measuring change. This figure presents responses by each participant from HM firms 
(grey) and the control group (black) in the four main variables measuring change from -3 (strong decrease) via 0 
(no change) to +3 (strong increase). For variable definitions and item wordings, see Table 4. 
Pearson and Spearmen rank correlations yield very similar results (Table 6), which suggests 
that estimates of differences between groups and associations between variables are largely unbiased 
from potential outliers or other distributional violations.  
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Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. HM -       
2. CurrTaxRisk -.41*** 
(-.45***) 
-      




-     





-    







-   





































Table 6: Bivariate correlations. This table displays Pearson correlation coefficients and Spearman (rank) 
correlation coefficients (in parentheses) between variables used in the main analyses. HM is a dummy variable, 
with 1 assigned to HM firms and 0 assigned to the control group. ***, ** and * indicate two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Correlations with the indicator variable HM (Table 6, column 1) reflect differences as 
indicated by t- and U-tests. In terms of effect size, both Pearson and Spearman Correlations with HM 
indicate strong differences between HM firms and the control group, in particular with regard to 
ΔCertainty and ΔTaxRisk. Furthermore, we find a considerable negative correlation between ΔCertainty, 
ΔTaxRisk, and ΔCosts. A relatively weak correlation between ΔTaxRisk and CurrTaxRisk suggests that 
the difference in current tax risk between HM firms and the control group cannot be explained solely by 
differences in ΔTaxRisk.  
While group differences and correlations provide insights into possible consequences of 
and reasons for HM participation, we conduct mediation analyses as outlined in the next section to shed 
more light on the interrelation between variables and to test the hypothesized mediation effects. 
5.3. Mediation analyses 
Mediation analysis of cross-sectional questionnaire data can give additional insights into associations 
between participants’ responses; we acknowledge that it allows no direct causal inferences. Despite our 
small sample size, we believe that these tests are valuable to better explain differences between HM 
firms and the control group and shed more light on firms’ potential self-selection into the HM program. 
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We thus use the following analysis to further test our main Hypotheses H1 to H5 and potential mediation 
effects as formulated in Hypotheses H1a, H2a, H3a, and H5a-c.  
For the mediation analyses, we use maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard 
errors using the sem function in STATA (version 16) in conjunction with the nlcom command to 
calculate indirect effects. We conduct the same analyses with the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes 
2020) using OLS estimation and bootstrapped standard errors for indirect effects (10,000 bootstrap 
samples), which results in virtually identical parameters and negligible differences in standard errors. 
To ensure that single outliers do not excessively drive results, we conduct robustness checks based on 
resampling, which are outlined at the end of this section. 
Mediation analysis is based on the decomposition of the total effect of an independent 
variable X on a dependent variable Y into a direct effect of X on Y, and an indirect effect of X on Y via 
M (see Figure 2 for an illustration of the basic model). To this end, we estimate the effect of X on M, as 
well as the simultaneous effects of M and X on Y. The net effect c of X on Y (controlled for M) is the 
direct effect and is equivalent to the coefficient estimate in a multiple regression. The product a*b of 
the effect estimates of X on M and M on Y (with the latter controlled for X) equals the indirect effect of 
X mediated by M. The gross effect of X on Y (without controlling for M) is the total effect and 
corresponds to the sum of direct and indirect effects c + a*b in the basic model presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the basic mediation model used in the analyses. X, M and Y represent the independent 
variable, the mediator variable, and the dependent variable, respectively. Arrows a, b and c represent the direct 
effects of X on M, of M on Y and of X on Y controlled for M, respectively. The indirect (mediated) effect of X on 
Y via M is measured by the product of a and b. 
In our analyses, we control all variables that measure perceived change for Years. For 
example, we analyze whether ΔCertainty (M) mediates the effect of HM (X) on ΔTaxRisk (Y), with both 
ΔCertainty and ΔTaxRisk being controlled for Years. We thus test the mediation HM à ΔCertainty à 
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ΔTaxRisk. As another example, we analyze whether ΔTRM (controlled for Years) mediates the effect of 
HM on CurrTRM.  
We find both a significant total effect of HM on ΔTaxRisk and a mediated effect via 
ΔCertainty (see Table 7 for model coefficients and Figure 3 for an illustration of the mediation model). 
We thus find support for H1, because HM firms report a significantly smaller increase in perceived tax 
risk than the control group, expressed in a significantly negative total effect of -1.513 of HM of 
ΔTaxRisk. Furthermore, these results support H1a, as a significant proportion of the difference in 
ΔTaxRisk appears to be mediated by ΔCertainty, rendering the remaining direct effect of HM on 
ΔTaxRisk non-significant. Much of this mediation effect can be attributed to a notable direct effect of 
ΔHM on ΔCertainty of 2.666, which is highly significant and, with responses being given on seven-
point scales, qualitatively large. The control variable Years shows a significant (at the 10% level) 
association with ΔTaxRisk when both HM and ΔCertainty are included in the model (see Table 7, 
column 3). This suggests an overall increase in tax risk over time independent of HM participation, 
because participants appeared to perceive a slightly larger increase of tax risk when they assessed change 
for a greater number of years. 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of the mediation model displayed in Table 7. Coefficients represent direct effects and the 
indirect mediation effect in parentheses. Effects on ΔCertainty and ΔTaxRisk are controlled for Years (not 
depicted). ***, ** and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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 Direct effects 





ΔCertainty - - -0.330** (0.130) 










R2 0.321 0.339 0.425 
 Indirect effects 
HM via  
ΔCertainty - - 
-0.880** 
(0.436) 
 Total effects 





Table 7: Model coefficients of the mediation effect of HM on ΔTaxRisk via ΔCertainty. Coefficients and standard 
errors (in parentheses) were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. The 
dummy variable HM represents HM participation, ΔCertainty and ΔTaxRisk reflect perceived changes in tax 
certainty and tax risk, respectively. Years represents the timeframe for which participants were asked to indicate 
change. Direct effects correspond to parameter estimates in multiple regressions and represent the effects net of 
any effect by control variables included in the model. Indirect effects of HM represent the mediation effect and 
equals the product of the direct effects of HM on ΔCertainty (Column 2) and of ΔCertainty on ΔTaxRisk (Column 
3). Total effects of HM represent the sum of direct and indirect effects and corresponds to the coefficient of HM 
in a regression on ΔTaxRisk without controlling for ΔCertainty (Column 1). ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
The next model (see Table 8 for model coefficients) reveals a significant total effect of HM 
on CurrTaxRisk of -1.175, indicating that HM firms report lower values of perceived current tax risk 
than the control group. However, we do not find support for hypothesis H2a, because the difference in 
perceived current tax risk is not significantly mediated by the perceived change in tax risk (ΔTaxRisk), 
owing to the lack of association between ΔTaxRisk and CurrTaxRisk. These results leave room for 
alternative explanations of the difference in CurrTaxRisk than the improvements experienced during 
HM participation. In particular, differences in tax risk may have existed before HM (non-)participation, 
which suggests that tax risk has influenced the self-selection or acceptance into the HM program. 
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 Direct effects 





ΔTaxRisk - - 0.040 (0.164) 
Years - 0.159 (0.107) - 





R2 0.169 0.321 0.171 
 Indirect effects 
HM via 
ΔTaxRisk - - 
-0.061 
(0.254) 
 Total effects 





Table 8: Model coefficients of the mediation effect of HM on CurrTaxRisk via ΔTaxRisk. Coefficients and standard 
errors (in parentheses) were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. The 
dummy variable HM represents HM participation, and ΔTaxRisk reflect perceived changes in tax risk. CurrTaxRisk 
is the perceived current tax risk. Years represents the timeframe for which participants were asked to indicate 
change. Direct effects correspond to parameter estimates in multiple regressions and represent the effects net of 
any effect by control variables included in the model. Indirect effects of HM represent the mediation effect and 
equals the product of the direct effects of HM on ΔTaxRisk (Column 2) and of ΔTaxRisk on CurrTaxRisk (Column 
3). Total effects of HM represent the sum of direct and indirect effects and corresponds to the coefficient of HM 
in a regression on CurrTaxRisk without controlling for ΔTaxRisk (Column 1). ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
With regard to H3, we again find that HM firms report significantly higher perceived 
current tax risk management quality, as expressed by a significant total effect of HM on CurrTRM of 
1.121. Concerning H4, we again do not find any evidence that firms experienced different developments 
in tax risk management quality during HM participation. Regarding H4a, we do not find a mediated 
effect of HM on CurrTRM due to the very similar responses in ΔTRM. These results also invite other 
explanations for the difference in CurrTRM than the improvements perceived during HM participation. 
As with tax risk, differences in TRM could thus have existed before HM (non-)participation, possibly 
leading to a higher likelihood of HM participation for firms with more advanced TRM. 
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 Direct effects 





ΔTRM - - 0.952*** (0.251) 
Years - -0.041 (0.064) - 





R2 0.118 0.014 0.372 
 Indirect effects 
HM via 
ΔTRM - - 
-0.025 
(0.324) 
 Total effects 





Table 9: Model coefficients of the mediation effect of HM on CurrTRM via ΔTRM. Coefficients and standard 
errors (in parentheses) were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. The 
dummy variable HM represents HM participation, and ΔTRM reflect perceived changes in the quality of tax risk 
management. CurrTRM is the perceived current quality of tax risk management. Years represents the timeframe 
for which participants were asked to indicate change. Direct effects correspond to parameter estimates in multiple 
regressions and represent the effects net of any effect by control variables included in the model. Indirect effects 
of HM represent the mediation effect and equals the product of the direct effects of HM on ΔTRM (Column 2) and 
of ΔTRM on CurrTRM (Column 3). Total effects of HM represent the sum of direct and indirect effects and 
corresponds to the coefficient of HM in a regression on CurrTRM without controlling for ΔTRM (Column 1). ***, 
**, and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Further analyzing the difference in the change in compliance costs experienced by firms 
(ΔCosts) and its potential mediators, we find a non-significant difference in the perceived change of 
compliance costs (ΔCosts) of -0.777. However, we still detect significant mediations via ΔCertainty 
(H5a) as well as ΔTaxRisk (H5b), but not via ΔTRM (H5c). With a simultaneous analysis of all three 
mediators, indirect effects add up to a total of -1.000, which exceeds the total effect. We thus find support 
for hypotheses H5a and H5b. Further exploring the relationship between HM, ΔCertainty, ΔTaxRisk, 
and ΔCosts, we find a dual mediation (significant at the 10% level) between the four variables while 
controlling other simple indirect and direct effects (see Figure 4 and Table 10, Column 6). 
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 Direct effects 





















ΔTRM - - - 0.284 (0.192) 
0.054 
(0.240) - 






















R2 0.138 0.244 0.348 0.167 0.333 0.373 


























- - - - - -0.353* (0.187) 
HM 





 Total effects 











Table 10: Model coefficients of the effects of HM on ΔCosts. Direct effects of HM on ΔCertainty and ΔTaxRisk, 
and on ΔTRM are displayed in Table 7 and Table 9, respectively. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) 
were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. The dummy variable HM 
represents HM participation. ΔCosts is the perceived change in compliance costs. ΔCertainty and ΔTaxRisk reflect 
perceived changes in tax certainty and tax risk, respectively. ΔTRM represents the perceived changes in the quality 
of tax risk management. Years represents the timeframe for which participants were asked to indicate change. 
Direct effects correspond to parameter estimates in multiple regressions and represent the effects net of any effect 
by control variables included in the model. Indirect effects displayed in Column 2-5 of HM represent the simple 
mediation effects and equal the product of the direct effects of HM on the mediator (see Table 7 and Table 9) and 
of the mediator on ΔCosts (Column 2-5). Indirect effects displayed in Column 6 include the coefficients of a dual 
mediation, which is the product of the effect of HM on ΔCertainty, of ΔCertainty on ΔTaxRisk, and of ΔTaxRisk 
on ΔCosts. Total effects of HM represent the sum of the direct and indirect effects and corresponds to the 
coefficient of HM in a regression on ΔCosts without controlling for any mediator (Column 1). ***, **, and * 
indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 4: Illustration of the mediation model displayed in Table 10. Coefficients represent direct effects and the 
indirect mediation effect in parentheses. Effects on ΔCertainty, ΔTaxRisk and ΔCosts are controlled for Years (not 
depicted). ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Robustness tests 
In addition to the prior analyses using U-Tests and Spearman correlations, we further 
ensure that results are not excessively driven by single outliers. To this end, we use jackknife resampling, 
which is based on consecutively dropping each observation from the sample, producing more 
conservative standard errors than bootstrapping and thus reducing significance of some effects. 
However, all previously significant effects remain significant at the 10% level (see Table 18 in 
Appendix 1).  
Moreover – similar to jackknife resampling – we repeatedly compute all original models 
with each participant being dropped once from the sample, resulting in a total of 40 estimates for each 
model parameter. As expected, dropping the most influential cases decreases the size and significance 
of all coefficients. However, all previously significant findings remain significant at least at the 10% 
level, except the twofold mediation effect of HM on ΔCosts (see Table 18 in Appendix 1). 
5.4. Additional analyses 
To provide deeper insights into differences between HM firms and the control group, we assess 
responses to a wide range of other items and scales used in the questionnaire. The following subsections 
outline perceived changes in tax compliance and the relationship with tax authorities, in perceived 
changes of specific types of tax risk and tax risk sources, in current sources of tax risk and tax risk 
management methods, in expectations from HM, and in attitudes towards tax compliance and risk. 
Because some questions appeared earlier in the questionnaire than questions addressing our main 
constructs of interest, we collected more responses to some items than for our main analyses. Descriptive 
statistics and group comparisons of items covered in this section are presented in Appendix 1. 
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Reported changes in tax compliance and the relationship with tax authorities 
As two main goals of cooperative compliance are to improve the relationship between 
taxpayers and tax authorities and to foster tax compliance in the long run, we inquired about the 
perceived change of these two potential HM outcomes. On average, both groups report a very similar 
increase in self-reported tax compliance. HM firms, however, report a considerable and significantly 
stronger improvement in the relationship quality than the control group (see Table 11 in Appendix 1).  
Perceived changes in specific types of tax risk and tax risk sources 
We also inquired on the change of more specific types of tax risk, namely the risk of 
penalties for the firm and for individual decision makers, the risk of litigation, the own personal risk for 
the participant, and reputational risk for the company. We find the same pattern as for general tax risk 
in responses to these items: the control group indicated significant increases in risk, while HM firms 
indicated slight decreases (see Table 12 in Appendix 1).  
In line with Mulligan and Oats (2009) and Wunder (2009), the survey also inquired on 
seven specific risk sources (transactional, operational, compliance, financial accounting, portfolio, 
management, reputational) and how participants perceived their change since entering HM or during the 
past years. Results mostly reflect the patterns found in other items measuring change in risk, particularly 
for transactional risk, operational risk, compliance risk, and management risk (see Table 12 in 
Appendix 1).  
Sources of tax risk 
In addition to the general measure of current tax risk used in the main analysis, again based 
on the classification of tax risk sources based on Mulligan and Oats (2009) and Wunder (2009), our 
survey also covered the specific risk sources (transactional, operational, compliance, financial 
accounting, portfolio, management, reputational) at the present time. While the control group indicated 
a significantly lower current operational risk, it also perceived a significantly higher compliance risk 
and management risk (see Table 13 in Appendix 1). While these differences could indicate underlying 
differences in the risk profile of the two groups, they may also reflect positive effects of HM, particularly 
on compliance risk. 
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Current tax risk management methods 
The survey also assessed the importance of seven distinct tax risk management methods, 
i.e., “systems to and/or procedures to identify and manage tax risk” in the company. The items covered: 
advance rulings by the tax administration, advance informal agreements with the tax administration, 
external advisors, extensive documentation, cost analysis on possible financial penalties, smell test 
based on individual experience and judgment, and following a benchmark firm.  
We find similar responses by the two groups in most items, expect for informal agreements 
and external tax advisors, with participants of HM firms reporting utilization of more informal 
agreements and less external advisors than the control group (see Table 14 in Appendix 1). These 
differences may reflect a stronger reliance on feedback and agreements with the authorities and less 
reliance on external tax advisors due to HM. 
Expectations about Horizontal Monitoring and importance of goals 
Before participants answered questions about the actual changes their firms had 
experienced, we asked them to indicate what changes they would expect (or, in the case of HM firms, 
had expected before entering HM) from participation in the HM program and how important they 
consider these possible changes. Items reflect the same topics covered in the main analysis, including 
tax risk, tax certainty, and compliance costs. For instance, we asked if participants expected an increase 
or a decrease in tax risk due to HM participation (on a scale from -3 to +3), and, how important they 
consider the goal of reducing tax risk (on a scale from 1 to 7). All items measuring expectations and 
perceived importance were only displayed if participants indicated that they had at least heard of HM, 
which reduced the number of participants in the control group. Descriptive statistics and group 
comparisons of expectations and the perceived importance are reported in Table 15 and Table 16 in 
Appendix 1. 
Overall, expectations about the HM projects appear to be similarly positive in the two 
groups, with both groups expressing particularly high importance of increasing tax certainty as well as 
high expectations about an increase of tax certainty through HM. Similarly, both groups attributed high 
importance to reducing tax risk and expected this goal to be achieved by the HM program. Only 
regarding items covering the risk of penalties, we find significant differences, with the control group 
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expecting a stronger reduction in these risks. Concerning the importance of goals, we find no significant 
differences between the two groups. Overall, these results indicate mostly similar expectations regarding 
HM performance and similar priorities regarding potential improvements. 
Attitudes about tax compliance and risk 
To assess differences in participants’ and firms’ understanding of tax compliance, we asked 
participants how much they personally – and their firm, respectively – would agree that tax compliance 
is a matter of “following the letter of the law“, and of “following the spirit of the law”. Moreover, 
participants were asked to indicate their personal risk attitude. Overall, participants from HM firms and 
non-HM firms show a similar attitude towards tax compliance and risk. However, we do find that HM 
firms indicate a (marginally significantly) higher importance of following the letter of the law than the 
control group (see Table 17 in Appendix 1). This may suggest that HM firms give slightly more priority 
to tax compliance than the control group. 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The way in which tax administrations and firms interact affects the governance structure 
and risk profile of firms. When the relationship between management and tax administrations is viewed 
from a principal-agent perspective, the state assumes the principal's role that participates in firms' profits 
by claiming a share via taxes. As a result, states and tax authorities have an inherent interest in reducing 
information asymmetries. 
We propose that high-quality tax risk management and transparency obligations commonly 
found in CC programs are alternative measures to reduce information asymmetries. In CC, firms provide 
transparency and establish tax control frameworks as part of their tax risk management systems. Tax 
administrations, on the other hand, discuss with firms the appropriate tax treatment of (complex) 
transactions at an early stage, thus offering tax certainty. Therefore, CC may reduce agency and 
signaling costs compared to conventional ex-post audits and may thus offer benefits for firms and tax 
administrations alike. Against this theoretical background, we use the case of the Austrian HM pilot 
project for a survey study. We analyze the association of HM participation with tax risk, with the quality 
of tax risk management systems, and with compliance costs. 
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We find strong evidence that HM firms experienced decreases in tax risk and compliance 
costs – differences that appear to be mediated by an increase in tax certainty. However, surprisingly, the 
perceived change in tax risk appears to be only weakly associated with the perceived current tax risk. 
These results may indicate that firms' current tax risk is determined predominantly by unobserved factors 
and not by the changes reported by participants. While this might point to a higher likelihood of low-
tax-risk firms applying and being accepted for the HM pilot project, it could also be due to other reasons, 
such as biased perceptions by participants. Results also indicate, in line with expectations, that HM firms 
already had more advanced tax risk management before participation in the HM pilot project: HM firms 
report significantly better current tax risk management, but a similar rate of tax risk management 
improvement as the control group. The significant association between the perceived current quality in 
tax risk management and its perceived change further support this conclusion. 
Overall, we find that HM firms perceive distinct benefits from the pilot project. Our results 
mostly support the notion that CC is an effective measure to reduce information asymmetries between 
principal and agent, as well as costs for the firm. Significantly, our findings suggest that CC reduces tax 
risk and compliance costs predominantly by increasing tax certainty. We also find some evidence that 
firms with better tax risk management and lower tax risk are more likely to participate in HM. This 
supports the idea that CC is more suitable for firms with overall less risky tax strategies because the 
benefits of CC should outweigh the potential benefits of more risky tax planning. These results align 
with our expectations and the notion of responsive regulation, which suggests that cooperative and 
service-oriented policies should be targeted at inherently compliant taxpayers. 
Despite the small number of HM firms, we find significant associations between HM and 
some variables of interest. Large differences in the perceived change in tax risk and tax certainty are 
especially noteworthy. To ensure that results are not driven by outliers, we also use non-parametric U-
tests and Pearson correlations, as well as repeated computations of our mediation models in which each 
observation is dropped once to provide a "worst-case" estimate of coefficients when the most influential 
observation is dropped. Our results hold. 
We find additional insights into the differences between HM firms and the control group 
and further support for our results in an additional exploration of responses: The perceived reduction in 
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tax risk by HM firms is also reflected in more specific types of risk, such as litigation risk or reputational 
risk. While HM firms do not report a stronger increase in tax compliance, they perceive that their 
relationship with tax authorities has improved significantly and that they rely more on informal advance 
agreements with tax authorities as a method of tax risk management than the control group. 
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, despite our efforts to disentangle reasons 
for and consequences of HM participation, our sample for both the treatment group and control group 
is subject to (self-)selection bias. Moreover, the small sample size may limit the generalizability of our 
results. Nevertheless, differences in many variables are unambiguous, and our sample covers the 
majority of Austrian HM firms. Second, the cross-sectional study design prohibits conclusive 
interpretation regarding causality. However, by using items about perceived change as well as the 
perceived current state, we were able to shed more light on possible causes and effects of CC. Third, 
our results are based on subjective assessments and voluntary participation in the survey. Differences 
between groups may thus be subject to biased perceptions, particularly confirmation bias, i.e., the 
tendency to justify the decision to participate in HM by overestimating its benefits. However, our 
participants' expert status speaks in favor of the validity and relevance of our results, as most participants 
are high-ranking employees and thus likely to be deeply involved in tax decisions of the firms. Fourth, 
our analysis is limited to large Austrian firms with a turnover of more than 40 million Euro, which have 
a probability of a conventional tax audit of nearly 100%. However, the Austrian HM project can be 
considered a prototypical CC program that closely follows the principles laid out by the OECD. Several 
countries limit HM to large businesses to match costs and benefits for tax authorities. Furthermore, 
Austria shows many similarities with other countries, particularly Germany, with regard to the tax 
system and macroeconomic, cultural, and legal features (e.g., Hoppe et al. 2019). We thus expect our 
results to be informative for other HM initiatives around the globe. 
Our study is the first to examine tax risk and tax risk management as both possible reasons 
for and consequences of CC participation from firms' perspective. While our research design does not 
allow direct identification of causality, we analyze HM firms and a control group with regard to both 
the perceived current state and the perceived changes in our variables of interest. In conjunction with 
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mediation analyses, our approach provides additional information about the causes and effects of HM 
participation.  
As CC is a relatively young concept, early analysis of its effects is valuable and important, 
and future research based on objective data is needed to corroborate our results in other countries. Our 
findings underscore the importance and promise of cooperative relationships that reduce costly 
information asymmetries and provide increased certainty for both sides. Therefore, we expect our results 
to be of interest to policymakers and firms alike, regarding both the decision to participate in a CC 
program and the design of cooperative tax policies. 
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Appendix 1: Tables from additional analyses 
 
HM firms 
(n = 9) 
 Control group  
(n = 31) 
 Comparisons 
Variables Mean SD Median 
Mean 







Perceived changes [strong decrease (-3) – strong increase (+3)] 
Compliance with tax laws 0.78 1.30 0 20.39  0.65+++ 0.98 0 20.53  0.13 -0.14 
Relationship quality with tax 
authorities 1.89
+++ 1.27 2 30.11  0.16 1.39 0 17.71  1.73*** 12.40*** 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics and group comparisons of changes in tax compliance and in the relationship with 
tax authorities. Significance levels are based on conventional independent t-Tests (for mean differences) and on 
exact U-tests (for mean rank differences). ***, ** and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively. +, ++, and +++ denote means of items/scales measuring perceived change which are 
significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.  




(n = 9) 
 Control group  
(n = 31) 
 
Comparisons 
Variables Mean SD Median 
Mean 







Perceived changes in specific tax risks [strong decrease (-3) – strong increase (+3)] 
Risk of penalties -1.11+ 1.45 0 9.00  1.03+++ 1.22 1 23.84  -2.14*** -14.84*** 
Risk of litigation -0.89++ 1.05 -1 8.67  0.94+++ 1.15 1 23.94  -1.82*** -15.27*** 
Risk of penalties for 
individual decision makers -0.78 1.30 0 10.83  0.74
+++ 1.13 1 23.31  -1.52*** -12.47*** 
Personal risk -0.56 1.59 0 14.00  0.55+++ 1.09 0 22.39  -1.10** -8.39** 
Reputational risk -0.22 1.39 0 13.61  0.87+++ 1.31 1 22.50  -1.09** -8.89** 




-0.44 1.67 0 9.00  0.74+++ 1.18 1 22.90  -1.17** -13.90*** 
Operational risk 
(examples: new business 
ventures, new operating 
models, new operating 
structure) 
-0.78 1.39 -1 8.67  1.23+++ 1.26 1 23.69  -2.00*** -15.03*** 
Compliance risk 
(examples: weak records and 
controls, legislative changes) 
-0.67 1.66 -1 10.83  0.68++ 1.45 1 22.86  -1.34** -12.02** 
Financial accounting risk 
(examples: changes in 
systems and policies) 
0.00 0.87 0 14.00  0.32++ 1.19 0 21.57  -0.32 -7.57 
Management risk 
(examples: changes in 
personnel, new/inexperienced 
resources) 
-0.11 0.33 0 13.61  0.35++ 0.92 0 22.19  -0.47 -8.58* 
Reputational risk 
(example: revenue authority 
investigation) 
0.00 1.23 0 9.00  0.55++ 1.31 0 21.77  -0.55 -12.77 
Portfolio risk 
(example: combination of any 
of the risks) 
-0.11 0.93 0 8.67  0.58++ 1.26 1 22.45  -0.69 -13.79** 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics and group comparisons of changes in specific types of tax risk and risk sources. 
Significance levels are based on conventional independent t-Tests (for mean differences) and on exact U-tests (for 
mean rank differences). ***, ** and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. +, ++, and +++ denote means of items/scales measuring perceived change which are significantly 
different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.  




(n = 11) 
 Control group  
(n = 36) 
 
Comparisons 
Variables Mean SD Median 
Mean 











3.91 2.07 3 23.86  4.00 1.85 4 24.04  -0.09 -0.18 
Operational risk 
(examples: new business 
ventures, new operating 
models, new operating 
structure) 
4.82 1.60 5 30.27  3.78 1.77 4 22.08  1.04* 8.19* 
Compliance risk 
(examples: weak records and 
controls, legislative changes) 
2.64 1.03 2 15.32  3.81 1.45 4 26.65  -1.17** -11.33** 
Financial accounting risk 
(examples: changes in 
systems and policies) 
2.64 1.12 2 18.50  3.39 1.48 3 25.68  -0.75 -7.18 
Management risk 
(examples: changes in 
personnel, new/inexperienced 
resources) 
3.00 1.48 3 17.82  3.83 1.54 4 25.89  -0.83 -8.07* 
Reputational risk 
(example: revenue authority 
investigation) 
2.73 2.20 2 19.00  3.53 1.81 3.5 25.53  -0.80 -6.53 
Portfolio risk 
(example: combination of any 
of the risks) 
3.27 1.62 3 20.86  3.72 1.63 3.5 24.96  -0.45 -4.1 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics and group comparisons of current sources of tax risk. Significance levels are based 
on conventional independent t-Tests (for mean differences) and on exact U-tests (for mean rank differences). ***, 
** and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
 




(n = 11) 
 Control group  
(n = 36) 
 
Comparisons 
Variables Mean SD Median 
Mean 







Importance of tax risk management methods [not important at all (1) – very important (7)] 
Binding advance rulings from 
tax administration 3.73 2.05 4 24.50  3.58 2.12 3 23.85  0.14 0.65 
Advance informal agreements 
with tax administration 5.00 2.19 6 31.18  3.56 1.99 3 21.81  1.44** 9.37** 
External advisors 5.18 1.40 5 17.91  5.97 1.08 6 25.86  -0.79* -7.95* 
Extensive documentation 5.91 1.22 6 26.32  5.47 1.59 6 23.29  0.44 3.03 
Cost analysis of potential 
penalties 2.55 2.02 2 21.91  2.69 1.72 2 24.64  -0.15 -2.73 
“Smell test” based on 
individual experience and 
judgement 
3.00 1.79 3 20.68  3.56 1.75 3 25.01  -0.56 -4.33 
Follow a benchmark firm 3.00 1.84 2 20.23  3.64 1.87 3 25.15  -0.64 -4.92 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics and group comparisons of the importance of tax risk management methods. 
Significance levels are based on conventional independent t-Tests (for mean differences) and on exact U-tests (for 





(n = 10) 
 Control group  
(n = 28) 
 
Comparisons 
Variables Mean SD Median 
Mean 







Expectations on the effects of Horizontal Monitoring [strong decrease (-3) – strong increase (+3)] 
Tax certainty 1.90+++ 1.66 2.5 21.15  1.82+++ 1.39 2 18.91  0.08 2.24 
Compliance costs 0.20 0.79 0 17.50  0.29 1.18 0.5 20.21  -0.09 -2.71 
Risk of penalties -0.20 1.40 0 24.85  -1.11+++ 1.29 -1 17.59  0.91* 7.26* 
Risk of penalties for 
individuals -0.30 1.16 0 24.45  -1.11
+++ 1.20 -1 17.73  0.81* 6.72* 
Tax risk -1.30++ 1.70 -2 17.60  -1.04+++ 1.40 -1 20.18  -0.26 -2.58 
Personal risk -0.30 1.06 0 22.15  -0.64+++ 1.10 -1 18.55  0.34 3.60 
Reputational risk -0.40 1.17 0 21.55  -0.75+++ 1.38 -1 18.77  0.35 2.78 
Risk of litigation -0.50 1.35 -0.5 19.95  -0.61++ 1.34 -1 19.34  0.11 0.61 
Compliance with tax laws 0.10 0.32 0 18.60  0.18 0.98 0 19.82  -0.08 -1.22 
Relationship quality with tax 
authorities 1.10
++ 1.29 0.5 18.05  1.21+++ 0.99 1 20.02  -0.11 -1.97 
Table 15: Descriptive statistics and group comparisons for expectations on Horizontal Monitoring. This table 
displays means, medians, and mean ranks of items measuring sources of tax risk as well as group comparison of 
means and mean ranks. Significance levels are based on conventional independent t-Tests (for mean differences) 
and on exact U-tests (for mean rank differences). ***, ** and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1, 
5 and 10% level, respectively. +, ++, and +++ denote means of items/scales measuring perceived change which are 
significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 




(n = 10) 
 Control group  
(n = 32) 
 Comparisons 
Variables Mean SD Median 
Mean 







Importance of goals [not important at all (1) very important (7)] 
Increase tax certainty 6.50 0.71 7 24.95  6.03 1.18 6 20.42  0.47 4.53 
Reduce compliance costs 4.80 1.40 5 21.60  4.69 1.77 5 21.47  0.11 0.13 
Reduce risk of penalties 5.00 2.00 5.5 19.20  5.44 1.83 6 22.22  -0.44 -3.02 
Reduce risk of penalties for 
individuals 4.40 1.96 4.5 16.35  5.34 1.91 6 23.11  -0.94 -6.76 
Reduce tax risk 5.30 1.49 5.5 19.85  5.56 1.22 6 22.02  -0.26 -2.17 
Reduce personal risk 4.30 1.89 4.5 18.60  4.91 1.75 5 22.41  -0.61 -3.81 
Reduce reputational risk 4.40 1.71 4.5 16.10  5.34 1.64 6 23.19  -0.94 -7.09 
Reduce risk of litigation 4.70 1.83 5 21.05  4.78 1.64 5 21.64  -0.08 -0.59 
Increase compliance with tax 
laws 5.30 1.57 6 26.60  4.41 1.70 4.5 19.91  0.89 6.69 
Improve relationship quality 
with tax authorities 5.70 1.25 5.5 23.75  5.25 1.48 5.5 20.8  0.45 2.95 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics and group comparisons for the perceived importance of goals. This table displays 
means, medians, and mean ranks of items measuring sources of tax risk as well as group comparison of means and 
mean ranks. Significance levels are based on conventional independent t-Tests (for mean differences) and on exact 





(n = 9) 
 Control group  
(n = 31) 
 Comparisons 
Variables Mean SD Median 
Mean 







“In my company, tax compliance means following the…” [strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7)] 
Letter of tax laws 5.78 0.97 6 25.89  4.81 1.60 5 18.94  0.97* 6.95 
Spirit of tax laws 5.89 1.90 6 23.00  5.87 1.12 6 19.77  0.02 3.23 
“To me personally, tax compliance means following the…”  [strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7)] 
Letter of tax laws 5.67 0.87 6 26.06  4.77 1.54 5 18.89  0.89 7.17* 
Spirit of tax laws 5.89 1.90 6 19.89  6.16 1.13 7 20.68  -0.27 -0.79 
Personal risk attitude [very risk-averse (1) – very risk-seeking (7)] 
Risk attitude 3.00 1.32 3 16.44  3.61 1.23 4 21.68  -0.61 -5.24 
Table 17: Descriptive statistics and group comparisons of attitudes towards tax compliance and risk. Significance 
levels are based on conventional independent t-Tests (for mean differences) and on exact U-tests (for mean rank 
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 Original sample (N = 40)  Dropped observations (N-1) 
Coefficients B prob pjn  Bmean Bmin Bmax pmean pmin pmax 
Effects of mediation model: HM on ΔTaxRisk via ΔCertainty ( Table 7) 
HM on ΔTaxRisk 
(total effect) -1.513 .012 .029  -1.513 -1.213 -1.790 .014 .001 .028 
HM on ΔTaxRisk 
(direct effect) -0.633 .354 .418  -0.633 -0.300 -0.995 .367 .138 .639 
Certainty on ΔTaxRisk -0.330 .026 .057  -0.330 -0.272 -0.446 .030 <.001 .063 
HM on ΔCertainty 2.666 <.001 <.001  2.666 2.503 2.925 <.001 <.001 <.001 
HM on ΔTaxRisk via ΔCertainty 
(indirect effect) -0.880 .033 .065  -0.880 -0.760 -1.201 .037 .002 .078 
Effects of mediation model: HM on CurrTaxRisk via ΔTaxRisk (Table 8) 
HM on CurrTaxRisk 
(total effect) -1.175 <.001 .003  -1.175 -1.044 -1.393 <.001 <.001 .002 
HM on CurrTaxRisk 
(direct effect) -1.114 .008 .022  -1.114 -1.114 -1.239 .010 .002 .033 
ΔTaxRisk on CurrTaxRisk 0.040 .806 .183  0.041 -0.008 0.147 .802 .360 .990 
HM on ΔTaxRisk -1.513 .012 .027  -1.513 -1.213 -1.790 .014 .001 .028 
HM on CurrTaxRisk via ΔTaxRisk 
(indirect effect) -0.061 .810 .831  -0.062 0.012 -0.263 .808 0.368 .990 
Effects of mediation model: HM on CurrTRM via ΔTRM (Table 9) 
HM on CurrTRM 
(total effect) 1.121 .006 .016  1.120 0.943 1.305 .007 .001 .014 
ΔTRM on CurrTRM 0.952 <.001 .001  0.952 0.846 1.073 <.001 <.001 .004 
HM on ΔTRM -0.026 .939 .945  -0.026 0.133 -0.205 .893 .528 .997 
HM on CurrTRM via ΔTRM -0.025 .939 .945  -0.025 -0.025 -0.200 .893 .538 .997 
Effects of mediation model: HM on ΔCosts via ΔCertainty, ΔTaxRisk, and ΔTRM (Table 10, column 5) 
HM on ΔCosts 
(total) 
-0.777 .121 .198  -0.777 -0.560 -1.086 .132 .014 .263 
HM on ΔCosts 
(direct) 
0.223 .525 .732  0.223 -0.162 0.446 .669 .371 .927 
HM on ΔCosts via ΔTaxRisk -0.585 .029 .058  -0.584 -0.482 -0.717 .034 .011 .077 
HM on ΔCosts 
(total indirect) 
-1.000 .004 .015  -1.000 -0.892 -1.219 .004 .001 .011 
HM via ΔCertainty  
via ΔTaxRisk (column 6) 
-0.353 .060 .097  -0.352 -0.268 -0.446 .066 .050 .114 
Table 18: Coefficients and their respective p-values from models with dropped observations. This table shows 
robustness checks for the results of mediation models reported in Tables 7-10. In the columns under Original 
sample the table shows original regression coefficients (B) and p-values based on robust standard errors (prob, 
original models were already computed using robust standard errors), including p-values based on the jackknife 
resampling method (pjn). Jackknife resampling resembles bootstrapping and is based on dropping each observation 
once, thus repeatedly estimating the coefficients of interest. In addition, we repeatedly compute models with each 
observation being dropped once from the sample. This results in 40 estimates of parameters and p-values, of which 
we report means, minima, and maxima under Dropped observations. Bmin  and  pmax thus reflect the smallest and 
least significant absolute effect found by dropping the observation (or one of the observations) which contribute 
most to the original estimate.  
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Appendix 2: Full questionnaire 
English version German version 
Familiarity with Horizontal Monitoring 
How familiar are you with horizontal monitoring in 
Austria? 
Wie vertraut sind Sie mit Horizontal Monitoring in 
Österreich? 
Answer options 
o Good knowledge 
o Somewhat familiar 
o Heard of it 
o Not at all familiar 
o Gute Kenntnisse 
o Etwas vertraut 
o Habe davon gehört 
o Überhaupt nicht vertraut 
Sources of Tax Risk (present) 
What are the sources of tax risk in your company? 
 
Welche Quellen hat steuerliches Risiko in Ihrem 
Unternehmen? 
Items 
• Transactional risk 
(examples: acquisitions, mergers) 
• Operational risk 
(examples: new business ventures, new operating 
models, new operating structure) 
• Compliance risk 
(examples: weak records and controls, legislative 
changes) 
• Financial accounting risk 
(examples: changes in systems and policies) 
• Management risk 
(examples: changes in personnel, new/inexperienced 
resources) 
• Reputational risk 
(example: revenue authority investigation) 
• Portfolio risk 
(example: combination of any of the risks) 
 
• Transaktionsrisiko 
(zB: Akquisitionen, Verschmelzungen) 
• Operatives Risiko 
(zB: neue Geschäftsfelder, neue Prozesse, neue 
Strukturen) 
• Compliance-Risiko 
(zB: Schwächen bei Aufzeichnungen oder 
Kontrollen, gesetzliche Änderungen) 
• Rechnungslegungsrisiko 
(zB: Änderungen in Rechnungslegungsprozessen 
oder -politik) 
• Management-Risiko 
(zB: Personalwechsel, neue oder unerfahrene 
MitarbeiterInnen) 
• Reputationsrisiko 
(zB: öffentlich gewordene steuerliche 
Überprüfungen) 
• Portfolio-Risiko 
(zB: Kombination der zuvor angeführten Risiken) 
Answer options for each item 






o To a great extent 7 






o In hohem Ausmaß 7 
Tax Risk (Present) 
How would you describe your company's tax risk 
profile? 
Wie würden Sie das steuerliche Risikoprofil Ihres 
Unternehmens beschreiben? 
Answer options 






o Very high tax risk 7 






o Sehr hohes steuerliches Risiko 7 
Tax Risk Management System 
Does your company have a tax risk management 
system (i.e. systems and/or procedures to identify and 
manage tax risks)? 
Hat Ihr Unternehmen ein System zum steuerlichen 
Risikomanagament (Tax Risk Management, z.B. 
Systeme oder Prozesse zur Identifikation und 
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Tax Risk Management Procedures 
 
How important are the following systems and/or 
procedures to identify and manage tax risks in your 
company 
Wie wichtig sind die folgenden Systeme / Prozesse zur 
Identifikation und Steuerung von steuerlichem Risiko 
in Ihrem Unternehmen? 
Items 
• Binding advance rulings from tax administration 
• Advance informal agreement with tax administration 
• External advisors 
• Extensive documentation 
• Cost analysis on possible financial penalties 
• "Smell test" based on individual experience and 
judgment 
• Follow a benchmark firm 
• Rechtsverbindlicher Auskunftsbescheid (Advance 
Ruling, § 118 BAO) 
• Informelle Abstimmung vorab mit der 
Finanzverwaltung (zB. EAS) 
• Externe Beratung 
• Ausführliche Dokumentation 
• Kostenalanlyse möglicher Finanzstrafen 
• "Bauchgefühl" auf Basis individueller Erfahrung 
und Beurteilung 
• Einklang mit anderen Unternehmen (benchmark) 
Answer options for each item 






o Very important 7 






o Sehr wichtig 7 
Other Tax Risk Management Procedures (Open Question) 
What other important systems exist in your company 
to identify and manage tax risks? 
 
Welche weiteren wichtigen Systeme / Prozesse gibt es 
in Ihrem Unternehmen zur Identifikation und 
Steuerung von steuerlichem Risiko? 
Text fields 















Tax Risk Management Quality (Present) 
Items 
• Is the identification and management of tax risk in 
your company part of the overall risk management 
system? 
• Is your tax risk management system well 
documented? 
• Is your tax risk management system operationalized 
in daily business? 
• Ist die Identifikation und Steuerung von 
steuerlichem Risiko in Ihrem Unternehmen Teil des 
allgemeinen Risikomanagement-Systems? 
• Ist Ihr steuerliches Risikomanagement-System gut 
dokumentiert? 
• Ist Ihr steuerliches Risikomanagement-System im 
Tagesgeschäft operationalisiert? 
Answer options for each item 






o To a great extent 7 






o In hohem Ausmaß 7 
Group Membership 
Is your company part of a group? Ist Ihr Unternehmen Teil eines Konzerns? 
Answer options 
o No 
o Yes, a group which operates only in Austria 
o Yes, a group which operates in multiple countries 
o Nein 
o Ja, ein Konzern, welcher nur in Österreich tätig ist 
o Ja, ein Konzern, welcher in mehreren Staaten tätig 
ist 
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Participation in the Cooperative Compliance Program 
Does your company participate in the horizontal 
monitoring project in Austria? 
Nimmt Ihr Unternehmen an dem Horizontal-
Monitoring-Projekt in Österreich teil? 
Answer options 
o Yes, because it is required by law 
o Yes, because my company or group has decided to 
do so voluntarily 
o No, because the option was not available for my 
company 
o No, because it does not meet my company's needs 
o No, for other reasons (please specify): _________ 
o Ja, weil es vorgeschrieben war 
o Ja, weil mein Unternehmen bzw. mein Konzern sich 
freiwillig dafür entschieden hat 
o Nein, da meinem Unternehmen nicht die 
Möglichkeit geboten wurde 
o Nein, da es nicht den Bedürfnissen meines 
Unternehmens entsprach 
o Nein, aus anderen Gründen (bitte angeben): 
____________ 
Time of Entering the Horizontal Monitoring Program 
When did your company enter into the horizontal 
monitoring program? 
Wann ist Ihr Unternehmen dem Horizontal-
Monitoring-Programm beigetreten? 
Answer options 














What were your company's expectations (decrease or 
increase) for the following factors when entering into 
the horizontal monitoring program? 
 
Control group: 
Which changes (decrease or increase) of the following 
factors would you expect from horizontal monitoring? 
CC firms: 
Welche Erwartungen hatte Ihr Unternehmen bei 
Eintritt in das Horizontal-Monitoring-Programm für 
die folgenden Faktoren (Ab- oder Zunahme)? 
 
Control group: 
Welche Veränderungen (Ab- oder Zunahme) der 
folgenden Faktoren würden Sie durch Horizontal 
Monitoring erwarten? 
Items 
• Tax certainty for your company 
• Compliance costs of your company 
• Risk of penalties for your company 
• Risk of penalties for individual decision makers in 
your company 
• Tax risk for your company 
• Your own personal risk 
• Reputational risk for your company 
• Risk of tax litigation for your company 
• Compliance of your company with tax laws 
• Quality of the relationship between tax authorities 
and your company 
• Steuersicherheit für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Rechtsbefolgungskosten für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Risiko von Strafen für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Risiko von Strafen für einzelne entscheidende 
Personen in Ihrem Unternehmen 
• Steuerrisiko für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Ihr persönliches Risiko 
• Reputationsrisiko für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Risiko eines Rechtsstreits in Steuerfragen für Ihr 
Unternehmen 
• Befolgung des Steuerrechts in Ihrem Unternehmen 
• Qualität der Beziehung zwischen Finanzverwaltung 
und Ihrem Unternehmen 
Answer options for each item 
o Strong decrease -3 
o -2 
o -1 
o No change 0 
o +1 
o +2 
o Strong increase +3 
o Starke Abnahme -3 
o -2 
o -1 
o Keine Veränderung 0 
o +1 
o +2 
o Starke Zunahme +3 
Importance of Goals 
How important do you consider the following goals? Wie wichtig schätzen Sie die folgenden Ziele ein? 
Items 
• Increase tax certainty for your company 
• Reduce compliance costs of your company 
• Reduce the risk of penalties for your company 
• Reduce the risk of penalties for individual decision 
makers in your company 
• Erhöhte Steuersicherheit für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Geringere Rechtsbefolgungskosten für Ihr 
Unternehmen 
• Geringeres Risiko von Strafen für Ihr Unternehmen 
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• Reduce tax risk for your company 
• Reduce your own personal risk 
• Reduce reputational risk for your company 
• Reduce the risk of tax litigation for your company 
• Increase compliance of your company with tax laws 
• Improve the quality of the relationship between tax 
authorities and your company 
• Geringeres Risiko von Strafen für einzelne 
entscheidende Personen in Ihrem Unternehmen 
• Geringeres Steuerrisiko für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Geringeres persönliches Risiko für Sie 
• Geringeres Reputationsrisiko für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Geringeres Risiko eines Rechtsstreits in 
Steuerfragen für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Verbesserte Befolgung des Steuerrechts in Ihrem 
Unternehmen 
• Verbesserte Qualität der Beziehung zwischen 
Finanzverwaltung und Ihrem Unternehmen 
Answer options for each item 






o Very important 7 






o Sehr wichtig 7 
Changes – Tax Risk and Advertised Benefits 
CC firms:  
How would you describe the actual changes (decrease 
or increase) of the following aspects since entering 
into the horizontal monitoring program? 
 
Control group: 
How would you describe the changes (decrease or 
increase) of the following aspects in your company 




Wie würden Sie die tatsächlichen Veränderungen (Ab- 
oder Zunahme) der folgenden Aspekte seit dem 




Wie würden Sie die Veränderungen (Ab- oder 
Zunahme) der folgenden Aspekte beschreiben, die 
während der letzten 10 [5] Jahre in Ihrem 
Unternehmen eingetreten sind? (Soweit Sie das 
beobachten konnten) 
Items 
• Tax certainty for your company 
• Compliance costs of your company 
• Risk of penalties for your company 
• Risk of penalties for individual decision makers in 
your company 
• Tax risk for your company 
• Your own personal risk 
• Reputational risk for your company 
• Risk of tax litigation for your company 
• Compliance of your company with tax laws 
• Quality of the relationship between tax authorities 
and your company 
• Steuersicherheit für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Rechtsbefolgungskosten für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Risiko von Strafen für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Risiko von Strafen für einzelne entscheidende 
Personen in Ihrem Unternehmen 
• Steuerrisiko für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Ihr persönliches Risiko 
• Reputationsrisiko für Ihr Unternehmen 
• Risiko eines Rechtsstreits in Steuerfragen für Ihr 
Unternehmen 
• Befolgung des Steuerrechts in Ihrem Unternehmen 
• Qualität der Beziehung zwischen Finanzverwaltung 
und Ihrem Unternehmen 
Answer options for each item 
o Strong decrease -3 
o -2 
o -1 
o No change 0 
o +1 
o +2 
o Strong increase +3 
o Starke Abnahme -3 
o -2 
o -1 
o Keine Veränderung 0 
o +1 
o +2 
o Starke Zunahme +3 
Changes – Tax Risk Sources 
CC firms: 
How have the following components of tax risk 
changed (decrease of increase) since entering into the 
horizontal monitoring program? 
 
Control group: 
How have the following components of tax risk 
changed (decrease or increase) in your company 
during the last 10 [5] years? 
(As far as you were able to observe) 
CC firms: 
Wie haben sich die folgenden Kompenenten des 
steurlichen Risikos seit dem Eintritt in das Horizontal-




Wie haben sich die folgenden Komponenten des 
steuerlichen Risikos in Ihrem Unternehmen während 
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der letzten 10 [5] Jahre verändert (Ab- oder 
Zunahme)? (Soweit Sie das beobachten konnten) 
Items 
• Transactional risk 
(examples: acquisitions, mergers) 
• Operational risk 
(examples: new business ventures, new operating 
models, new operating structure) 
• Compliance risk 
(examples: weak records and controls, legislative 
changes) 
• Financial accounting risk 
(examples: changes in systems and policies) 
• Management risk 
(examples: changes in personnel, new/inexperienced 
resources) 
• Reputational risk 
(example: revenue authority investigation) 
• Portfolio risk 
(example: combination of any of the risks) 
• Transaktionsrisiko 
(zB: Akquisitionen, Verschmelzungen) 
• Operatives Risiko 
(zB: neue Geschäftsfelder, neue Prozesse, neue 
Strukturen) 
• Compliance-Risiko 
(zB: Schwächen bei Aufzeichnungen oder 
Kontrollen, gesetzliche Änderungen) 
• Rechnungslegungsrisiko 
(zB: Änderungen in Rechnungslegungsprozessen 
oder -politik) 
• Management-Risiko 
(zB: Personalwechsel, neue oder unerfahrene 
MitarbeiterInnen) 
• Reputationsrisiko 
(zB: öffentlich gewordene steuerliche 
Überprüfungen) 
• Portfolio-Risiko 
(zB: Kombination der zuvor angeführten Risiken) 
Answer options for each item 
o Strong decrease -3 
o -2 
o -1 
o No change 0 
o +1 
o +2 
o Strong increase +3 
o Starke Abnahme -3 
o -2 
o -1 
o Keine Veränderung 0 
o +1 
o +2 
o Starke Zunahme +3 
Changes – Tax Risk Management Quality 
CC firms: 
How have the following aspects changed (decrease or 




How have the following aspects changed (decrease or 
increase) in your company during the last 10 [5] 
years? (As far as you were able to observe) 
CC firms: 
Wie haben sich die folgenden Aspekte seit dem 
Eintritt in das Horizontal-Monitoring-Programm 
verändert (Zu- oder Abnahme)? 
 
Control group: 
Wie haben sich die nachstehenden Aspekte in Ihrem 
Unternehmen während der letzten 10 [5] Jahre 
verändert (Ab- oder Zunahme)? (Soweit Sie das 
beobachten konnten) 
Items 
• Degree to which the general risk management 
system is formalised (i.e. well documented) 
• Quality of the general risk managament system 
• Degree to which the tax risk management system is 
formalised (i.e. well documented) 
• Quality of the tax risk management system 
• Degree to which tax risk is included in the general 
risk management system 
• Ausmaß der Formalisierung des generellen 
Risikomanagement-Systems (zB. ausdrücklichen 
Dokumentation) 
• Qualität des generellen Risikomanagement-Systems 
• Ausmaß der Formalisierung des steuerlichen 
Risikomanagement-Systems (zB. ausdrücklichen 
Dokumentation) 
• Qualität des steuerlichen Risikomanagement-
Systems 
• Ausmaß, in dem das steuerliche Risiko im 
generellen Risikomanagement-System erfasst ist 
Answer options for each item 
o Strong decrease -3 
o -2 
o -1 
o No change 0 
o +1 
o +2 
o Strong increase +3 
o Starke Abnahme -3 
o -2 
o -1 
o Keine Veränderung 0 
o +1 
o +2 
o Starke Zunahme +3 
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Other Changes (Open Question) 
CC firms: 
What other important tax-related changes has your 




What other important tax-related changes has your 
company experienced during the last 5 years? 
(As far as you were able to observe) 
CC firms: 
Welche weiteren wichtigen steuerbezogenen 
Veränderungen konnte Ihr Unternehmen seit dem 




Welche weiteren wichtigen steuerbezogenen 
Veränderungen konnte Ihr Unternehmen während der 
letzten 10 [5] Jahre feststellen? (Soweit Sie das 
beobachten konnten) 
Text fields 
















Geben Sie bitte bis zu fünf weitere positive bzw. 















Group Parent Residence 














o Vereinigtes Königreich 
o Deutschland 
o Frankreich 





Approximately, what are the annual total sales 
(turnover) of your company in Austria? 
Wie hoch ist ca. der jährliche Umsatz Ihres 
Unternehmens in Österreich? 
Answer options 
o Less than 0.7 million euro 
o 0.7 - 10 million euro 
o 10 - 40 million euro 
o 40 - 250 million euro 
o 250 - 1,000 million euro 
o More than 1 billion euro 
o No answer 
o Weniger als 0,7 Millionen Euro 
o 0,7 - 10 Millionen Euro 
o 10 - 40 Millionen Euro 
o 40 - 250 Millionen Euro 
o 250 - 1000 Millionen Euro 
o Mehr als 1 Milliarde Euro 
o Keine Angabe 
Worldwide Sales 
Approximately, what are the annual total sales 
(turnover) of your group worldwide? 
Wie hoch ist ca. der weltweite jährliche 
Konzernumsatz? 
Answer options 
o Less than 0,7 million euro 
o 0.7 - 10 million euro 
o 10 - 40 million euro 
o 40 - 250 million euro 
o 250 - 1,000 million euro 
o more than 1 billion euro 
o No answer 
o Weniger als 0,7 Millionen Euro 
o 0,7 - 10 Millionen Euro 
o 10 - 40 Millionen Euro 
o 40 - 250 Millionen Euro 
o 250 - 1000 Millionen Euro 
o Mehr als 1 Milliarde Euro 
o Keine Angabe 
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Jurisdictions 
Approximateley, how many tax jurisdictions is your 
company subjected to annually? 
Mit dem Steuerrecht wie vieler unterschiedlicher 
Länder setzt sich Ihr Unternehmen ca. pro Jahr 
auseinander? 
Answer options 
o One tax jurisdiction (domestic only) 
o 2-5 tax jurisdictions 
o 6-10 tax jurisdictions 
o 11-20 tax jurisdictions 
o More than 21 tax jurisdictions 
o No answer 
o Steuerrecht eines Landes (nur Inland) 
o Steuerrecht von 2-5 Ländern 
o Steuerrecht von 6-10 Ländern 
o Steuerrecht von 11-20 Ländern 
o Steuerrecht von mehr als 21 Ländern 
o Keine Angabe 
Stock Exchange 
Is your company or any other company in the group 
publicly listed on a stock exchange? 
Ist Ihr Unternehmen oder ein anderes 




o No answer 
o Ja 
o Nein 
o Keine Angabe 
Tax Compliance (Firm) 
In my company, tax compliance means... In meinem Unternehmen bedeutet steuerliche 
Compliance... 
Items 
• ...following the letter of tax laws 
• ...following the spirit of tax laws 
• ... dem Wortlaut des Steuerrechts zu folgen 
• ... dem Sinn des Steuerrechts zu folgen 
Answer options for each item 






o Strongly agree 7 






o Stimme stark zu 7 
Position 
What is your position in your company? Welche Position haben Sie in Ihrem Unternehmen 
inne? 
Answer options 
o Chief Executive Officer 
o Chief Financial Officer 
o Head of Accounting 
o Tax Director 
o Tax Manager 
o Assistant Tax Manager 
o No answer 
o Other (please specify): __________ 
o Vorstandsvorsitzende/r, Geschäftsführer/in (CEO) 
o Finanzvorstand (CFO) 
o Leiter/in Rechnungswesen 
o Leiter/in Steuerabteilung 
o Steuerexperte/in 
o Steuersachbearbeiter/in 
o Keine Angabe 
o Andere (bitte angeben):__________ 
Tax Compliance (Personal) 
To me personally, tax compliance means... Für mich persönlich bedeutet steuerliche 
Compliance... 
Items 
• ...following the letter of tax laws 
• ...following the spirit of tax laws 
• ... dem Wortlaut des Steuerrechts zu folgen 
• ... dem Sinn des Steuerrechts zu folgen 
Answer options for each item 






o Strongly agree 7 






o Stimme stark zu 7 
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Personal Risk Attitude 
How would you describe your personal risk attitude? Wie würden Sie Ihre persönliche Risikoneigung 
einschätzen? 
Answer options 
o Very risk-averse 1 o Sehr risikoscheu 1 
o 2 o 2 
o 3 o 3 
o 4 o 4 
o 5 o 5 
o 6 o 6 
o Very risk-seeking 7 o Sehr risikofreudig 7 
Age 
What is your age? Bitte geben Sie Ihr Alter an. 
Answer options 
o Under 25 
o 25 - 34 
o 35 - 44 
o 45 - 54 
o 55 - 64 
o Over 64 
o No answer 
o Unter 25 
o 25 - 34 
o 35 - 44 
o 45 - 54 
o 55 - 64 
o Über 64 
o Keine Angabe 
Gender 




o No answer 
o Weiblich 
o Männlich 
o Keine Angabe 
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